University\u27s Role in Promoting Minority Group Employment in the Construction Industry by Chayes, Antonia H. et al.
THE UNIVERSITY'S ROLE IN PROMOTING
MINORITY GROUP EMPLOYMENT IN
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
AToI%1T H. CB:AyES f
CBRISToPE L. KAuFimAN tt
RAYMOND L. WREELE, JR.ttt
Guaranteeing equal employment opportunity in federally created
jobs has traditionally been at the forefront of the Government's attack
on nationwide racial discrimination. This emphasis reflects the Gov-
ernment's ostensibly great ability to change patterns of employment
where the sanction of withholding federal funds is available.
A series of executive orders has been promulgated to effectuate
these policies.1 Currently effective is Executive Order 11246,2 re-
quiring that contractors on projects involving federal funds shall "not
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." I Moreover, the con-
tractor is obligated to "take afllrinative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment,
without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 4
Responsibility for the administration of this Order resides in the
Secretary of Labor. The Secretary has broad rulemaking power to
define the scope of the contractor's duty of affirmative action.5 In
addition, both the Secretary and the contracting agency have authority
to initiate investigations and to hold hearings to determine com-
pliance.6 Finally, these same parties are delegated authority to invoke
severe sanctions against noncomplying contractors, ranging from can-
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1See Note, Executive Order 11246: Antidiscrimination Obligations in Govern-
ment Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 590, 590 (1969).
23 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
3 Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 202, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2 000e (Supp.
V, 1970) (emphasis added).
4Id. (emphasis added).
5 Id. §201, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).61d. §§206, 208, 3 C.F.R. 405 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
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celling the contract and blacklisting the contractor from federally
funded contracts to recommending judicial action by the Attorney
General.
7
An additional party becomes involved in the case of federally
assisted construction contracts. Executive Order 11246 imposes a
duty on the grantee of federal funds to "assist and cooperate actively
with the administering department or agency and the Secretary of
Labor in obtaining the compliance of contractors and subcontractors
with those contract provisions and with the rules, regulations, and
relevant orders of the Secretary." S Although the Order appears to
contemplate grantee action solely at the behest of the Government, some
grantees may come under independent pressure to foster minority
employment. A university engaged in a program of continued con-
struction, for example, may be pressured by its students to compensate
for what the students consider the Government's failure to effectuate
a policy of equal employment. Further, the pervasiveness of the prob-
lem of minority group employment argues for the university's assertion
of leadership in easing the problem at least in its own construction
projects.
For such an institution, Executive Order 11246 may provide a
legal mechanism for furthering minority group employment. This
Article explores the problems, both practical and legal, facing uni-
versities attempting such action. After a preliminary discussion of the
conditions underlying racial imbalance in the construction industry, the
Article introduces as a case study the dispute over employment prac-
tices in the construction of a Tufts University dormitory. The study
highlights the impact of a crisis situation in which legal factors can
form only a part of the basis for decisions. Both the judicial and
administrative remedies open to a university under an operative con-
tract are then discussed in a more general context. The Article next
considers the university's options before it has completed negotiating
its construction contract. Finally, a broader perspective is assumed and
proposals for both concerted university action and a refocusing of
governmental energies are evaluated.
I. RACIAL IMBALANCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The construction industry has been increasingly attacked by both
the public and private sectors for racially discriminatory employment
practices. At first glance, emphasis on construction might seem curious
in view of the overall magnitude of the equal employment opportunity
7Id. §§209-12, 3 C.F.R. 406-07 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
8Id. §301, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
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problem.' Statistics reveal that racial imbalance in the building trades
is neither greater nor less than in most other occupations. A recent
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission survey of the racial
composition of building trades local unions operating referral systems,
although perhaps not accurate in absolute terms,10 does reflect recog-
nizable trends. Black membership in the unions is not proportionate
to the racial composition of the total population. The study found 8.4
percent black membership overall in the reported trades. Membership
in representative trades was found to be as follows:
Laborers ......... 30.5%
Bricklayers . ........ 9.6%
Plasterers ......... 14.0%
Roofers . ......... 13.5%
Plumbers . . ....... 0.2%
Sheet Metal Workers ...... 0.2%
Electrical Workers . ...... 0.6%
Elevator Constructors ...... 0.4%
Asbestos Workers . ...... 0.9%
These statistics are not surprising: they reveal a pattern prevalent
throughout American industry." In the construction industry minor-
ity groups fill a relatively high proportion of low skill, low wage trades
(laboring, bricklaying, roofing) but a virtually insignificant proportion
of the skilled crafts (electrical work, plumbing, sheet metal work).
Yet the construction industry comes under especially heavy fire-
probably in part because of its connection with institutional building.
Large institutional building projects are eminently visible, and racial
imbalance among the workmen is readily identifiable.' 2 Moreover,
because much institutional construction is publicly financed, political
means for exerting pressure for nondiscriminatory hiring are avail-
able. 13 Finally, although construction pays relatively high wages, its
blue-collar identification causes many to believe that it is more accessible
to those with inferior educational and training qualifications than
white-collar occupations.
14
9 See D. Box & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COmmUNITY 128-29
(1970); D. Q. Mills, The Construction Industry: Adjustments for Minority Group
Entry 13, Jan. 27, 1970 (unpublished paper) [hereinafter cited as Mills].
10 EEOC Reveals Statistics on Minority Membership in Unions, EEOC News
Release (Sept. 28, 1969). The data was based on returns from only 3700 of 5000
locals operating hiring halls, and covered less than /1 of the industry's work force.
Mills 7.
31 Mills 11; see Box & DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 124-29.
12 Interview with James E. Flynn, Attorney for Vappi Constr. Co. of Cambridge,
Mass., in Cambridge, Mass., Mar. 13, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Flynn Interview].
13 Cf. Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Apprenticeship,
16 HASTINGs L.J. 285, 314-15 (1965).
14 Mills 15-16; Flynn Interview.
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Thus racial discrimination in the construction industry attracts
attention because it is easily perceived and unexpected, and because the
means of amelioration are thought to be readily at hand. Universities,
as recipients of substantial amounts of federal construction funds, may
face pressures to insure equitable minority employment because they are
expected to be both intolerant of discrimination and in a position to act
against it. Assessment of the prospects for effective university action
demands a realistic appraisal of both the structure of the construction
industry and the causes of racial imbalance within it.
A. Characteristics of the Construction Industry
1. Decentralization
On a single university construction project several contractors
usually perform disparate tasks. A large general contractor normally
carries out with his own manpower the basic structural phases of the
work, such as carpentry, cement finishing, and bricklaying; but a group
of specialty trade subcontractors actually perform the bulk of the
work.'5  These subcontractors, ordinarily responsible for installing
plumbing, plastering, heating, and electrical wiring, provide their own
labor and materials and are subject only to the supervision of the
general contractor for the proper performance of their specialized jobs.
This decentralization of functions has two principal causes. First, in-
stitutional and commercial building construction is a complex process
involving numerous operations, each requiring a high degree of
specialized knowledge and skill.1" Second, entrenched craft tradition
among workers has fostered a powerful guild system consisting of
numerous craft unions representing particular specialized trades.17 Be-
cause employment control lies largely with these unions, decentralized
decisionmaking has been perpetuated in the industry and has carried
over to employers. As a result, on any particular project, sixty to
ninety percent of the total dollar volume of the work goes to sub-
contractors performing approximately seventeen to twenty-five dif-
ferent trade functions.' 8
2. Mobility
Work demands on any particular project often fluctuate so much
that a particular craft or contractor may be involved at the site only
15W. HABER & H. LEVINsON, LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVTY IN THE
BUILDING TRADES 19 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HABER & LEvINsoxq]; Flynn Inter-
view.
16 HAER & LEviNsoN 19.




for brief and intermittent periods and then with varying manpower
needs. Crews constantly shift on and off the job as work progresses,
and at no time are all the men and crews eventually employed present
simultaneously. Accordingly, the labor force moves from employer
to employer, and any single contractor may have a turnover of from
150 to 200 percent during the course of a single project. 9 In general,
a contractor's volume of operations is too small to permit the steady
employment of a full-time complement of qualified journeymen; rather,
in addition to his permanent staff of "key men," he needs a readily
available labor supply of skilled workers from which he may draw.
This need and the strong craft structure in the industry enable the
union locals to become the centralized regional pools for recruitment
and referral.
3. The Unions
Several peculiar ramifications flow from the functioning of union
locals as regional manpower pools.
a. Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining in the building trades reflects the regional
approach to employment and accentuates the role of unions as de facto
employers. The often unpredictable demands for the rapid redistribu-
tion of men in the regional labor pool among various projects require
a preestablished and uniform understanding of employment terms for
all jobs and all contractors 20 transcending any particular project.
Although difficult to generalize, 2 collective bargaining is typically
carried out between specialty craft union locals and contractor asso-
ciations.' For example, in Boston the general contractors bargain
through the Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts and the
Building Trades Employers' Association; these groups negotiate
agreements with the craft union locals ordinarily employed by the
general contractors. 23 Many subcontractors have formed similar asso-
ciations-such as the Master Plasterers of Boston-to negotiate with
individual specialty craft unions.24 The unions in turn are loosely
bound together in the Building and Construction Trades Department
19 Id.
20 See Sherman, Legal Status of the Building and Construction Trades Unions
in the Hiring Process, 47 GEo. L.J. 203, 205 (1958).
21 See HAmE & Lvm sox 40-42.
22 1d. 40.
23 E.g., Agreement of Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc., and Building
Trades Emp'rs' Ass'n of Boston & E. Mass., Inc., with Cement Masons Local 534,
Apr. 30, 1969.
2 4 See HABER & LEvnmsoN 38; Flynn Interview.
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within the AFL-CIO.25 Local building trades councils, like the Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council in Boston, attempt coordination
and control of the other organizations. 8  In some cities these councils
bargain with contractor associations over certain general provisions
and "declarations of principles"; but with few exceptions individual
craft representatives negotiate wage rates and working rules.
27
b. Union Hiring Halls
This fractionalized nature of bargaining has given craft union
locals considerable power.28 In addition to being the central referral
agencies for their areas, the locals either have obtained the additional
security of preferential hiring hall provisions with the union largely
determining job qualifications or, despite nonexclusive agreements,
have operated such halls in practice. 29  For example, in a typical agree-
ment the contractor notifies the hiring hall first whenever a vacancy
arises, and the union refers any available workers qualified according
to a predetermined priority scheme."0 Only if the hall has no men to
refer will the contractor turn elsewhere for workers. Prior to the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, similar hiring hall agreements
were written into collective bargaining agreements partially to per-
petuate the "closed shop" (referral of union members exclusively).
Taft-Hartley outlawed the "closed shop" and substituted the less
exclusive "union shop." "' In the construction industry, 2 under a





2 9 Flynn Interview.
3O E.g, Agreement, supra note 23.
31 Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964);
see Note, Unilateral Union Control of Hiring Halls: The Wrong and the Remedy,
70 YALE L.J. 661, 663 (1961).
32 In 1959, Congress amended the Taft-Hartley Act by adding, inter alia, § 8(f),
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1964), to clarify the applicability of the Act to the construction
industry. It provides that:
(f) It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and
(b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and
construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (Or
who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construc-
tion industry with a labor organization of which building and construction
employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action
defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice) because
(1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established
under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such
agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment,
membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of the agreement, which-
ever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such
labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or
gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for
such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or ex-
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"union shop" agreement, nonunion members may be hired and allowed
to work for seven or thirty days before being required to join the
union, and any union member cannot be expelled from a union op-
erating a union shop for any offense other than nonpayment of dues.
The courts have upheld exclusive union hiring hall arrangements, but
only if the hall operates to assure equal referral to both union members
and nonunion workers.
33
Despite legal prohibition, many sectors of the construction in-
dustry retain arrangements resembling the "closed shop." "' Con-
tractors have delegated much responsibility for judging job qualifica-
tions to the unions. Unions in turn attempt to standardize the skill
and content of their craft as a means of job and wage control by setting
membership and referral standards; " union membership then becomes
identified with skill and is often crucial both in referral and hiring.
36
4. Entrance Into the Construction Trades
a. The Skilled Trades
In the more skilled mechanical trades, the unions largely control
entry through private negotiations or by promoting the passage of
legislation enhancing their control. A good example arose in the area
of apprenticeship training, one of the major means of entry into the
skilled trades. 7  The National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 38 author-
ized the establishment of the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training
(BAT) in the Department of Labor, primarily to promote apprentice-
ship programs run by joint labor-management committees.3 9 An ap-
prenticeship program meeting certain minimum standards may be
registered 4o with BAT or with a cooperating state agency with stand-
perience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities
for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the in-
dustry or in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this
subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsection 8(a) (3) of this
section: Provided further, That any agreement which would be invalid, but
for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant
to section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title.
33 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 269, Elec. Workers, 357 F2d 51 (3d Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 382-382A, 279 F2d 951 (8th Cir. 1960); cf.
Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
34 HABER & LEvnvsoN 71.
35 See F. R. MARSHALL & V. BRIGGS. THE NEGRO AND APPRENTICESHIP 13 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as MARSHAL. & BRIGGS].
36 See HABER & LEvIsoN 71; Sherman, supra note 20, at 205-06.
37 Mills 49-50.
3 3 Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 663, 50 Stat. 664, as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 50-50b
(1964).
39 MARSHALL & BRIGGs 11-13.
40 Once registered, an apprenticeship program is also subject to the nondiscrimina-
tion provisions promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.1-30.16
(1970). See generally M. SovERN, LEGAL. RESTRAINTS ON RAcIAL DiscRimiNATiON
IN EMPLOYMENT 194-97 (1966).
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ards comparable to BAT's.4 Unions and employers may determine
their own apprenticeship requirements, and if they administer their own
programs in compliance with the broad regulations set by BAT or state
agencies, BAT gives them technical assistance. 2 The ultimate sanc-
tion for noncompliance with the regulations is deregistration of the
apprenticeship program.43  Although this remedy may not seem very
meaningful, it does assume importance with regard to apprenticeship
programs involved in the construction of federally funded university
buildings. The Davis-Bacon Act' governs the wages of "mechanics
and laborers" on federal public works contracts involving more than
$2,000. Regulations provide that "[a]pprentices will be permitted to
work as such only when they are registered" with BAT or a cooperating
state agency." Any employee listed on the payroll at an apprentice wage
rate but not registered "shall be paid the wage rate determined by the
Secretary of Labor for the classification of work he actually per-
formed," which often means the journeyman scale.4 ' To preserve the
incentive provided by graduated pay scales and to avoid undue expense
to contractors, most apprenticeship programs are registered."
The unions retain a great deal of control over the standards for
entry and the numbers of applicants to be accepted.' Largely to
foster job and wage control and to control the supply of labor, the
unions have set high prerequisites for apprenticeship programs: for
example, applicants may be required to have a high school diploma,
to meet specified age requirements, to exhibit good moral character,
and to be free of a criminal record. 9 Restrictive journeyman-
apprentice ratios,8 0 state licensing laws,5 and often unnecessarily long
apprentice programs 2 further deter prospective applicants. Only a
41 See 29 C.F.R. § 30.16 (1970) ; Sovxax, supra note 40, at 195-96.
4 2 
MARSHAL & BRIcaS 11.
4329 C.F.R. § 30.11(b) (1970). Apprenticeship programs administered by con-
tractors subject to Executive Order 11246 are subject to the nondiscrimination regu-
lations whether or not they are registered. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to 60-1.47 (1970).
Thus noncompliance could lead to those sanctions available against substantive viola-
tions of the Executive Order.
4440 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-7 (1964) (originally enacted as ch. 411, 46 Stat.
1494 (1931)).
45 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a) (4) (1970).
46 Id.; see Mills 51.
47 See Mills 49.
4 8 MARSHALL & BRIGGs 13.
49 Id. 13, 15-17.
50 To keep employers from abusing the use of apprenticeship labor and to limit
the number of apprentices, each trade sets a fixed ratio of apprentices to journeymen.
See E. Hain, Black Labor in the Boston Construction Industry 5, 1969 (unpublished
thesis in Harvard Law School Library). Moreover, various state statutes have
limited apprentice/journeymen ratios in several trades. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws Ain.
ch. 142, § 3A (1965) (1 plumbers' apprentice per journeyman).
51 Flynn Interview.
52 See MARSHALL & BRIGGS 22.
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few openings in these programs are available each year in the most
desirable trades.5" Other means of entry into the skilled trades are
at least as limited. Although apprenticeship currently accounts for a
declining percentage of workers in many trades, 4 hiring "off the
street" by union referral or, if a hiring hall is nonexclusive, by a
contractor directly, is uncommon. Only workers with relatively high
qualifications, gained through experience in related trades or in training
programs, can pass the union-administered journeyman's examination.55
b. The Less Skilled Trades
In manual labor and carpentry, in the "trowel trades" of masonry,
bricklaying, and cement finishing, and in other trades requiring rela-
tively little skill, entry is easier through nonapprenticeship routes.56
Depending on the hiring hall arrangement, a worker with some ex-
perience or training can gain access either through union referral or
direct contractor employment. In some of these less skilled trades
there are journeyman retraining and upgrading programs and both
private and public training programs. 57
5. The Limits of University Influence on Industry Policies
Decentralization and the predominance of the union locals in the
construction industry make it difficult for the university to reach effec-
tively all the parties necessary to achieve racial balance. Dealing
directly with only a general contractor, the university has no formal
bargaining relationship with either the subcontractors or the union
locals. Moreover, an analysis of the causes of racial imbalance in the
construction industry indicates that the structure of the industry further
isolates the university.
B. The Causes of Racial Imbalance in the
Construction Industry
1. Overt Racial Discrimination
The most obvious barriers to minority group employment in the
building trades are present overt discrimination and the continuing
effects of past discrimination.
531d. 18-19; Hain, supra note 50, at 7.
64 Strauss, Apprenticeship: An Evaluation of the Need, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY
AND THE LABOR MARKET 302-05 (A. Ross ed. 1965).
55 There is some evidence that unions augment their labor supply both by having
members work substantial overtime and by granting temporary work permits. The
latter practice suggests that institutionalized qualification requirements are overly
restrictive. Cf. Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Minority Group
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a. Contractors
The precise extent of overt discrimination practiced by construc-
tion contractors is unknown, but presumably they hold the same atti-
tudes regarding racial minorities that are widespread in society.58
Contractor discrimination should not, however, be overemphasized.
High levels of construction activity in the recent past have led many
contractors to recognize minority group workers as a potential source
of new manpower. 9  As one commentator has stated, "[I]n many
areas there are no more insistent and (in some cases) effective ad-
vocates of increased minority participation in the building trades than
the employers." 'o
b. Unions
Certain building trades unions have overtly pursued racially dis-
criminatory membership, referral, and training policies.6 ' And even
when these unions have ceased overt discrimination, nepotistic rules per-
petuate its past effects.' The national union leadership has urged an
end to racial prejudice, but the attitudes of the local membership, in
whom the real union power lies, continue to reflect discriminatory atti-
tudes prevalent in the society at large.63 Such attitudes, when fortified
by widespread fear of job competition perhaps deriving from the per-
vasive job insecurity in the construction industry, and by feelings that
nepotism is both moral and proper, become particularly hard to
change."
2. Educational and Cultural Factors
Even when fair employment laws have eliminated overt racial dis-
crimination and its vestigial influence on business decisions, racial im-
balance remains.65 Statistics demonstrating that racial imbalance in the
construction industry is confined primarily to the more skilled trades re-
inforce the view that general societal discrimination in education and
housing is largely responsible. Insufficient numbers of minority group
workers are qualified or desire to become qualified in construction
skills. Recruitment and training are the crucial problems. For ex-
)8 MARSHALL & BRIGGS 34.
59 Mills 20.
60 Id.61 See, e.g., Dobbins v. Local 212, Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 443
(S.D. Ohio 1968).62 See, e.g., Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir.
1969).
6 See Bori & DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 134-35.
64 See MARSHALL & BRIGGS 36.
65 Mills, supra note 9, at 17-19; see BoK & DuNLOP, supra note 9, at 130-31;
Hain, supra note 50, at 11.
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ample, educational, test score, and noncriminal record requirements
screen out large numbers of interested minority group applicants.66
The residential concentration of minority groups in central cities ex-
acerbates transportation expenses associated with an industry often
requiring workers to travel into the suburbs. 7  Cultural factors further
decrease the number of minority group members desiring to work in
the building trades. In many of the trades, there is a strong base of
fixed ethnic composition; a skilled trade is often passed from father
to son." The minority group communities lack a tradition in craft
work because of past discrimination and the recent arrival of many
blacks who abandoned agricultural employment in the South.69 Often
the workers have some skills applicable to several trades but none
developed sufficiently to meet the specifications of any particular craft."°
3. Conclusion
If a university could negotiate directly with all of the parties in
the construction industry complex, it still could not completely remedy
minority underemployment on its construction projects by obtaining
promises of nondiscrimination. The causes of racial imbalance are too
pervasive for solution by simple and direct university action. The
large pool of qualified minority group workers needed to achieve a
proper balance simply does not exist, and those workers who are
qualified often prefer to stay in the minority group communities to
work on local projects rather than travel to the suburbs where many
universities are located. The solution to racial imbalance requires
extensive changes in recruitment, improvements in training, and al-
teration of overly restrictive job qualifications, areas traditionally con-
trolled by the unions or joint union-contractor committees. The
university is thus far removed from both the parties and the means
essential to increasing minority employment in the construction
industry.
II. CASE STUDY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DORMITORY AT
JACKSON COLLEGE FOR WOMEN, TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The controversy began in October 1969, when the Tufts Afro-
American Society, composed of black undergraduates, delivered to the
6 6 ARSHALL & BRIGGS 41-45.
67 See BoK & DUNLOp, mipra note 9, at 130.
6 8 Flynn Interview, vlipra note 12; see MARSHALL & BRIGGS 18; cf. ABER &
LEviNsoN, supra note 15, at 73.
69 See MARSHALL & BRIGGS 37-41. See also Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 13,
at 292.
70 Telephone interview with Paul Parks, Dir. of the Model Cities Administration
of Boston, in Boston, Mass., Apr. 10, 1970.
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university eight demands relating to the hiring of minority group
workers on a dormitory project. The cost of the dormitory was
1,914,500 dollars, of which the federal government was to lend ninety
percent.71  The focal demand of the students was that at least twenty
percent of the work force on the job be black and third-world workers.7
A. The Parties
The parties to the controversy do not fit the normal model for a
legal action. They were not the parties to a typical law suit, nor, in fact,
were they all parties to the law suit filed in the case. They were not
the parties contemplated by administrative arrangements, 73 and they
were certainly not the parties in a usual labor-management controversy.
In fact, the failure of each to anticipate the presence and recognize the
interests of at least some of the others aggravated all of their problems.
1. The University
A relatively small, private university, Tufts enrolls 4415 students
in its three undergraduate colleges, its graduate school of arts and
sciences, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and employs
310 full faculty. The university's main campus is located at Medford,
Massachusetts, about ten miles northwest of Boston. With limited
7 1 Contract between Trustees of Tufts College and John A. Volpe Constr. Co.,
Aug. 7, 1968, on file at office of Trustees of Tutts College.
72 By "third world workers," the students said they meant to include not only
Asians but also Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking people who are repre-
sented both in Boston and among construction workers. The students also demanded
that:
2. The [college] Administration take whatever actions that are necessary
to insure that contractors and sub-contractors immediately hire and continually
employ the proposed number of Black and Third World Peoples.
3. The administration, contractor, and sub-contractors contact the New
Urban League to secure Blacks skilled in the building trades.
4. The administration cooperate with the co-chairman of the Labor
Committee of Afro in monitoring the hiring and treatment of Black and
Third World workers on the Jackson dormitory.
5. The co-chairman of the Labor Committee be invited to observe nego-
tiations sessions with contractors and sub-contractors on the new dormitory.
6. The administration submit weekly written reports to Afro on the
situation of Black and Third World workers.
7. On the construction of the new dormitory and on future construction
and renovation projects, the administration and its contractors should ag-
gressively seek Black sub-contractors.
8. The administration begin discussions on the construction of the new
medical center with the Labor Committee and representatives of the Black
community.
Letter from Dan Coleman and Charles Yancey, co-chairmen of the Labor Comm. of
the Tufts Univ. Afro-Am. Soc'y, to Burton C. Hallowell, Pres., Tufts Univ.;
C. Russell de Burlo, V. Pres., Tufts Univ.; Albert D. Ullman, Provost, Tufts Univ.;
and Antonia H. Chayes, Dean, Jackson Coll.; undated (delivered Oct. 20, 1969).
73 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-121 (1970).
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endowment and alumni support, the university relies heavily on
tuition fees.
2. The Contractor
The Volpe Construction Company, which held the dormitory
contract, is a major nationwide construction firm with contracts worth
forty-four million dollars in seven states. The Volpe company is a
member of the Associated General Contractors, on whom it relied
during all negotiations. Its labor force consists largely of the workers
from less skilled trades: laborers, bricklayers, and carpenters. It relies
on subcontractors for more skilled and specialized work. There were
nineteen subcontractors on the Jackson dormitory job.
3. Students
Tufts undergraduate colleges contained 137 black students who
organized the Afro-American Society in the spring of 1969. The
university had initiated a large-scale recruitment effort to enroll black
students in 1968, and by 1969 had achieved 7.7 percent representation
in the freshman class. Even though other students strongly supported
the Afro-American Society, black and white students maintained
separate leadership throughout the Jackson dispute.
4. The Unions
The construction was under a union shop contract. Fifteen
unions were represented but, at the time the controversy began, only
eleven were on the job.74  Some of them, Local 22 of the Laborer's
Union for example, had heavy black representation. Others had
scarcely any. All were represented by Fred M. Ramsey of the Building
and Construction Trades Council. In October 1969, all the black
workers on the job were union members.
5. The Federal Government
The Department of Housing and Urban Development was the
grantor agency. It operated under Executive Order 11246 and was
responsible for the development and implementation of a satisfactory
affirmative action program in each contract it approved.75 It operates
74 Lists from the Office of Facilities, Planning, & Constr., Tufts Univ., July 1970.
The following locals represented the unions: Carpenters Local 218, Laborers Local 22,
Cement Masons Local 534, Bricklayers Local 3, Electrical Workers Local 103, Pipe-
fitters Local 537, Plumbers Local 12, Engineers Local 12, Ironworkers Local 7,
Lathers & Roofers Local 33, Sheet Metal Workers Local 17.
7,5See E.xec. Order No. 11,246 §303(a), 3 C.F.R. 408 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2 000e
(Supp. V, 1970).
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in the first instance at the regional level, through the regional officer
of equal employment opportunity. In matters of contract compliance,
however, it is ultimately responsible to the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCC) in the Department of Labor,7 which also
maintains regional offices. This dual responsibility caused substantial
confusion in administrative procedure.
B. The Facts
1. The Demands
The student demand for a twenty percent quota implied a concrete
and numerical approach to the obligation of affirmative action. It
represented a complete departure from Volpe's essentially procedural
affirmative action program " accepted by both HUD and the university
and incorporated into the construction contract. The contract pro-
vided for appointment of an equal employment opportunity officer, dis-
semination throughout the company of information on equal employ-
ment opportunity policy, and "particular efforts" at recruitment of
minority group workers. Potential sources of black employees were
listed: "schools, colleges, employment offices, union offices and other
recruitment sources." The phrase "an Equal Opportunity Employer"
was to be placed in all advertisements. The contract promised train-
ing, placement, and promotion efforts described as "vigorous."
All of these provisions are boilerplate terms, merely recapitulating
the language of Executive Order 11246. This careful verbal com-
pliance with the Order has become the standard approach throughout
the industry 78 but has not been challenged by the Government.
Neither Tufts nor the HUD Area Engineer objected to this affirmative
action plan at the preconstruction conference" 9 with Volpe on August
28, 1968.
A Notice to Proceed had been issued on August 9, 1968. Never-
theless, deficiencies in the contractual program were recognized. Most
serious were (1) the absence of affirmative action plans from the two
subcontractors with contracts of 100,000 dollars or more as required
76See id. §205, 3 C.F.R. 404-05 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970);
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.6 (1970).
77John A. Volpe Constr. Co., Affirmative Action Plan for Jackson College
Residence Hall, Tufts Univ., submitted Aug. 1968, copy on file at Office of Facilities,
Planning, & Constr., Tufts Univ.
7 8 See, e.g., Joint Apprentice & Training Comm. for the Elec. Contracting Indus.
of Greater Boston, Affirmative Action Program (approved by the Comm. of Mass.,
Compliance Title 29, Jan. 10, 1966) ; Building Trades Employers Ass'n of Boston &
E. Mass., BTEA Newsletter, Bull. No. 9 (June 18, 1968).
79 See generally 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1970) (requirements of affirmative action
compliance programs), quoted at text accompanying note 104 infra.
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by HUD regulations,s" and (2) the failure of Volpe to hire an equal
employment opportunity officer as its own affirmative action program
required. Notwithstanding these problems, ground was broken on
the project on September 28, 1968.
On April 8, 1969, the two delinquent subcontractors still had not
submitted affirmative action programs. The HUD Area Engineer
consequently set a deadline of April 17 for the completion of the total
program. The two subcontractors filed their plans in time, but the
Area Engineer found the plumbing subcontractor's plan to be "worth-
less," " although he gave neither reasons for this appraisal nor guide-
lines for revision. He accepted a rewritten affirmative action plan on
April 30, 1969. Thus, despite the requirement that a satisfactory
affirmative action program be developed for the entire project within
120 days after commencement of the contract, 2 Volpe failed to com-
plete its program until seven months after construction began. Even
then, the program was adequate only on paper. HUD officials recog-
nized the program's weaknesses, but took no corrective action.
The university repeatedly inquired throughout the spring and
summer of 1969 about Volpe's efforts to recruit minority group
workers. In response, Volpe sent the university summaries of its
telephone job orders to nonunion black recruitment sources. These
summaries uniformly recorded either failure to make contact with the
source or, if contact was made, failure of the source to produce the
desired workers.8 3  But, even though university pressure for more
vigorous recruitment and more regular reporting increased during the
summer, Tufts never took the position that Volpe had failed to comply
with Executive Order 11246 until the black students began to express
their concern in the autumn.
Student requests for more minority group workers coincided with
increases in the work force. The black students discussed their re-
quests with Provost Ullman in late September before making demands.
University officials anticipated strong student action and summoned
8o U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Devel., Form No. 907, Instructions for Con-
tractors Regarding Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11246, July, 1967.
An OFCC regulation requires subcontractors with 50 or more employees and a con-
tract worth $50,000 or more to develop a written affirmative action compliance
program. 41 C.F.R. §60-1.40(a) (1970).
81 Letter from George E. Meyer, HUD Area Engineer, to Lawrence L. Ketchen,
Dir. of Facilities, Planning, & Constr., Tufts Univ., Apr. 18, 1969, on file at Office
of Facilities, Planning, & Constr., Tufts Univ.
82 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(c) (1970).
83 Memorandum from David Mirabassi, V. Pres., Volpe Constr. Co., to Ralph
Niles, Equal Emp't Opportunity Officer, Volpe Constr. Co., Apr. 17, 1969, copy on
file at Office of V. Pres., Tufts Univ. The memorandum lists 13 telephone calls to
Martin Gopen, Director of Labor and Transportation of the Urban League in Boston.
It includes such notations as: "Mr. Gopen not in"; or, after an order for two
carpenters had been placed, "The men did not show up."
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colleagues responsible for academic and student affairs to cope with
the problem, until then solely the concern of physical plant personnel.
Simultaneously, the university began to negotiate with Volpe for a
sharp increase in the numbers of minority group workers. On October
1, there were only six black or Puerto Rican workers in a total con-
struction crew of 107.
A first meeting with company president Peter Volpe and his re-
cently appointed equal employment opportunity officer was incon-
clusive. The contractor explained his efforts to recruit black workers,
and his problems with absenteeism and turnover among them. He
cited the inadequate transportation between Boston, where the black
workers lived, and the Medford construction site. Volpe's work force
then consisted primarily of laborers, carpenters, and bricklayers, trades
with a relatively high proportion of blacks. Volpe pointed out, how-
ever, that workers from the mechanical trades would soon be required
on the job and that there were virtually no blacks in those unions. The
university officials called for a meeting with the mechanical trade sub-
contractors, which was set for October 22.
Meanwhile, the university sought outside held in defining an effec-
tive affirmative action program, and in ascertaining what results in
terms of minority group employment could reasonably be expected.
Among those consulted were Robert Randolph, the HEW field engineer
handling HUD's compliance problems in Boston, Reginald Brown and
Howard Shelton, compliance officers for the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, and Paul Parks, Boston's Model Cities Administrator.
These men formed an informal advisory team concerned not only with
the dormitory issue, but also with the twenty-seven million dollar Tufts
New England Medical Center complex soon to be constructed in
Boston's South End. They saw in Tufts' willingness to act in the
Medford controversy a potential for imposing effective contract stand-
ards in the larger project, which might then be used as a model
throughout the area.
On October 20, students invited Martin Gopen, Director of Labor
and Transportation of the Urban League, and Leo Fletcher, leader of
the United Community Construction Workers (UCCW),8' to an open
meeting at which black students set a two-week deadline for compliance
with their demands. Gopen justified the twenty percent minimum for
minority group employment as fairly reflecting the racial composition
of the Boston metropolitan area.85
84 UCCW is an independent, industrially organized union whose members are
mostly, but not entirely, black construction workers.
85 A 1968 study of Boston proper showed the city to be 17% black. UNITED
COMMUNITY SERVICES OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON, RESEARCH DEP'T, BLACK AND WHITE
IN BOSTON, Table 1, at 7 (1968). Another study found 16.9%. HARVARD-MIT JOINT
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The total number of skilled minority workers presently unem-
ployed or otherwise available for job openings was questioned. The
university had been informed that few black journeymen were un-
employed, particularly in the more skilled trades. Gopen denied any
shortage and asserted there were 800 black construction workers in
the area. Arguing that there would be no effective federal enforce-
ment action, he called upon the university to suspend the contract and
to accept the risk of liability for breach in order to force decisive action
from Volpe, the Government, or both. This proposal became the
focus of student and faculty demands as the controversy developed.
The October 22 meeting between Tufts, Volpe's officers, and the
subcontractors recapitulated much of the earlier discussion. Several
subcontractors stated they had sought blacks in their area " for ap-
prenticeship openings and had found none. And Gopen, they said, had
failed to produce skilled workers on their request. The subcontractors
did not answer directly the question whether, under their collective
bargaining agreements, they could recruit outside the union locals'
hiring halls. They called attention to the nondiscrimination clauses in
their agreements, but spoke also of possible retaliation available to the
union locals for outside hiring. The only concrete outcome of the
meeting was Volpe's promise to place job orders for workers with
UCCW and the Workers' Defense League, and to report these calls
to Tufts, which could then monitor recruitment efforts on a current
basis. The subcontractors made no such promises, although their work
forces would be employed in the immediate future.
2. Courses of Action Available to the University
Eleven days before the student-imposed deadline the university
consulted legal counsel. The university needed to select a course of
action from one or more of the following alternatives.
a. Court Action
The university and its counsel considered the possibility of suing
Volpe for failure to comply with its contractual affirmative action
obligation. The lawsuit presented difficult jurisdictional and sub-
stantive questions. Even if these were surmounted, remedies were
hard to predict: money damages appeared inappropriate, specific relief
CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES, BOsTON AREA STmY (1970) (to be published). Puerto
Ricans are estimated to comprise 2.1% of the city's population. Id. Other races
comprise less than 1%. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION: 1960, CHARACTlESTICS OF POPULATION, pt. 23, Massachusetts (1960). The
best estimates for the metropolitan area as a whole, however, give a black population
of only 5%. BLACK AND WHIE IN BOSTON, supra, Table 1, at 7.
86 These subcontractors are based in suburban Boston where few black people live.
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raised serious problems of enforcement, and a declaratory judgment
might be ineffective."' Moreover, there was the problem of delay and
the possibility that completion of the construction would moot the
issues before the case could be decided.
b. Contract Cancellation
Many students and faculty members wanted the university to sus-
pend the contract and stop work on the job. This would have thrust the
burden of initiating litigation or other remedial proceedings upon the
contractor. The university would raise its claims that the affirmative
action clauses had been breached by counterclaim. The university
was prepared to accept the considerable delay in the completion of the
contract this course would entail. The risk of substantial liability for
damages caused Volpe by the delay was the most serious deterrent.
c. Federal Agency Enforcement
The university's informal advisory group of Boston and federal
officials earlier suggested that recourse to administrative procedures
might resolve the university's problems. Nevertheless, the procedure
outlined by OFCC regulations appeared to be cumbersome, time-
consuming, and unavailable for a party with the university's standing.
The thin record of administrative enforcement was also discouraging.
d. Negotiation and Political Action
Continued negotiation with Volpe seemed to be the most viable
approach even though it appeared unlikely that Volpe would adopt
either the numerical or percentage employment goals demanded by the
students. Rather, Volpe was under extreme pressure to oppose the
students' demands. The unions upon whom Volpe depends nationwide
were firmly committed to fight any type of quota system."8 To shift
the balance in the negotiations, the university would need to bring
local and state governmental bodies, federal officials, and newspapers
into the controversy. Concerted action by local universities appeared
helpful not only as a means of intensifying public pressure on Volpe in
this controversy, but also as the best possible source for long-range
solutions.
3. The University's Efforts
In the following days the university tried to influence Volpe
through all four possible courses of action outlined above.
8 7 Text accompanying notes 174-214 infra.
88 See Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metropolitan Dist. of Boston,
News Release, Nov. 13, 1969.
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On the evening of October 31, university officials reviewed the
situation with legal counsel. The consensus was that the university's
case did not warrant suspending the job on the ground of noncompli-
ance with the contract. The university's principle problem was that
the federal officials responsible for securing compliance had accepted the
contractor's affirmative action program as written, without determining
whether the program was adequate. The lawyers recommended an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the state court, where
they thought it would be easier to defeat a motion to dismiss. Suit was
accordingly filed in Middlesex Superior Court on November 3. Al-
though the university was not wholly optimistic, it issued a press release
expressing "hope of a precedent-setting decision." S
At the same meeting the university decided to ask federal officials
to review the situation fully preliminary to a request to initiate formal
administrative compliance proceedings. The university realized that
this weakened its lawsuit by strengthening the contractor's potential
defense that the federal agencies had primary jurisdiction in determin-
ing compliance. Although an investigator from the HUD regional
office compliance staff visited the university on November 3 and was
given full access to files and records, neither he nor the unofficial ad-
visory group expected speedy or definitive federal action. A second
conference, held a week later, included HUD representatives from
Washington and established a four-month timetable for administrative
action, from initial investigation to ultimate decision. The university's
standing to bring action was not questioned. At the time of the meet-
ing, the Jackson dormitory was thirty-seven percent completed. It was
expected to reach fifty-two percent of completion by the end of De-
cember, and seventy-five percent by March.
The university continued to negotiate with the contractor, and
the contractor with the unions. On November 6, Volpe reported that
five additional black workers had been hired, bringing the total then
working on the project to twelve out of ninety-nine. Volpe refused to
fix a numerical goal for minority group hiring, but concentrated on
improving recruitment and reporting procedures. Volpe expressed
willingness to negotiate with universities in the vicinity for the estab-
lishment of a training and apprenticeship program for minority group
workers. But this latter possibility was dampened by Fred M. Ramsey,
Secretary-Treasurer of the Building and Construction Trades Council,
in reaction to a student attempt to close the construction site. On
November 9, through a letter written by its counsel to Volpe, Tufts
formally identified eleven specific job openings and demanded that
89 Tufts Univ., Office of Public Information, News Release, An Explanation to
the University Community, Nov. 5, 1969.
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minority group workers be hired to fill them. Included were openings
for two watchmen-jobs not provided for in the original contract, but
for which the university was prepared to increase its contractual pay-
ments. Filling these positions would have brought minority group
employment to twenty out of ninety-seven. Two weeks later Peter
Volpe wrote to Tufts President Burton C. Hallowell, refusing to
implement preferential hiring because of his company's contracts with
the unions, "some of which require that the first inquiry for job
vacancies be made with the subject union." 0
Meanwhile, President Hallowell urged other university presidents
to cooperate in creating an interuniversity committee on equal employ-
ment opportunity which could develop a concerted strategy for dealing
with affirmative action in federally assisted construction. It was
estimated that, even excluding the new Boston campus of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, the universities would construct buildings in
the Boston area worth 100 million dollars during the next three
years." By November 19, Boston University, MIT, and Brandeis
expressed support for the suggested committee. Harvard declined to
participate, however, despite pressure from its black students, prefer-
ring to seek solutions for its own problems independently. Wellesley
College and Northeastern University later joined the group, and
Harvard, in fact, participated informally.
On November 23 the interuniversity committee met with John
Wilks, Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Wilks
asked whether the universities would welcome a "Philadelphia Plan"
for Boston, in which the Department of Labor would set areawide
percentage goals for minority group hiring in specified construction
trades. He indicated that the Department of Labor would devise a
plan for Boston if it found enough support from many groups, including
the black community. Six university presidents later sent a joint
letter to the Secretary of Labor requesting such action from his
department 2
The interuniversity committee also discussed the possibility of
establishing an interuniversity contract compliance board. The com-
mittee considered several model clauses for contractual compliance, in-
cluding a scheme requiring quotas. Draftsmen were charged with
submitting proposed language for such clauses by December.
90 Letter from S. Peter Volpe, Pres., Volpe Constr. Co., to Burton C. Hallowell,
Pres., Tufts Univ., Nov. 25, 1969, on file at Office of the Pres., Tufts Univ.
91 These estimates were developed informally by the interuniversity committee in
December 1969. Interview with Quinn Mills, Indus. Rel. Prof., MIT, Apr. 9, 1970.
92 Letter from Morris B. Abram, Pres., Brandeis Univ.; Ruth Adams, Pres.,
Wellesley Coll.; Arland S. Christ-Janer, Pres., Boston Univ.; Burton C. Hallowell,
Pres., Tufts Univ.; Howard W. Johnson, Pres., MIT; and Asa S. Knowles, Pres.,
Northeastern Univ.; to George P. Shultz, Sec'y of Labor, Dec. 22, 1969, copy on file
at Office of Pres., Tufts Univ.
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Two more governmental agencies meanwhile entered the dispute:
the Massachusetts Advisory Committee of the United States Civil
Rights Commission and the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination.
The Massachusetts Advisory Committee, chaired by Father Robert
F. Drinan, then dean of Boston College Law School, held a public hear-
ing at Tufts on November 7, during the height of the student demon-
strations. The committee members made an unannounced trip to the
construction site, accompanied by university officers and black students.
On the site black workers were questioned about the conditions of
their employment and about union discrimination, black unemployment,
and patterns of discrimination in the construction industry. All the
black workers questioned were union men, and they surprised some
students by stating that they were well treated on the job. Question-
ing of foremen and shop stewards revealed job openings, thus pro-
viding the university with guidance for its subsequent demand on Volpe
for thirteen additional minority group employees. Father Drinan's
committee made several recommendations, the most important being a
four-day moratorium on police presence and student disruption. Al-
though not formally adopted, the substance of this proposal was tacitly
accepted by both the university and the students.
The onsite inspection and Tufts' subsequent demands on Volpe
led to the hiring of two Haitian bricklayers on November 10. A
week later they were fired, and a sharp dispute immediately arose over
whether the contractor's action was discriminatory or justified by the
men's unsatisfactory performance. The Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination intervened on complaint from the fired brick-
layers. After an informal hearing on November 24, the commission
chairman requested that the contractor rehire the bricklayers for three
weeks for a thorough evaluation of their work. Although this order
was without legal sanction, Volpe complied. On November 25, when
the two Haitian workers returned, the white masons did not report
for work, stating that it was "too cold." They stayed out until
December 2. On December 5 the architect found the black masons'
work inadequate, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina-
tion concurred, and the men were fired, this time without further ado.
4. The Construction Site Confrontation
All these negotiations occurred against a background of intensify-
ing confrontation between students and administration at Tufts. From
the time the black students set their November 3 deadline for action, the
possibility of student disruption and the means for dealing with it
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became the prime considerations for the Tufts administration. The
university had to determine what circumstances might compel it to
call outside police to the campus, and whether it was contractually
bound to provide protection for the construction site. And it had to
consider whether the contractor could or would act if the university did
not, and the likely form of police intervention at Volpe's behest.
The university had reported to black students on the progress of
its negotiations, but had little success in allaying their demands. Two
days after the deadline, at 6:30 a.m., November 5, students took over
the construction site and barred the entrance. Leo Fletcher, head of
the UCCW, appeared with seven black workers and claimed that he
could produce five more by afternoon. The white workers arrived
about 7:30 a.m., milled around, but did not attempt to enter the site.
Volpe declared a "no work" day and hired two black bricklayers later
in the day from among the workers Fletcher had produced but declared
that there were no openings for the rest (carpenters and laborers).
By noon the regular workers had dispersed, although it was unclear
whether the subcontractors would pay their workmen for the day. The
students then left the site. Fred M. Ramsey demanded that the uni-
versity provide protection for his men, maintaining that they had a
right to work and would not leave the site peacefully a second day.
After other unsuccessful efforts to avert further disruption, the uni-
versity filed a previously prepared application for an injunction in the
Middlesex Superior Court. By late afternoon, the court issued a
temporary restraining order narrowly delimiting permissible student
action. 3 At 6:00 a.m., November 6, police from the Boston area sur-
rounded the construction site. The Afro-American Society and its
white student allies quickly withdrew.
An emergency faculty meeting, convened late in the day of the
student takeover, voted after extensive debate to recommend that the
president close the site. The vote was forty-eight to thirty-six with
nine abstaining. This was the first significant consideration of the
issues by the whole arts and sciences faculty. Four days later, how-
ever, the faculty reversed itself by an equally narrow vote on the basis
of a report from an ad hoc committee appointed by the faculty com-
mittee on committees immediately after the first meeting.
On November 7, while Father Drinan was conducting his hearing,
black and white students peacefully demonstrated at Ballou Hall, the
university's administrative center. The demonstration was repeated
on November 10, and produced minor property damage.




On November 12, 150 students picketed Volpe's office in Malden,
Massachusetts, and then returned to Tufts and seized East Hall, the
building containing the computer used by the university for data
processing, payroll computation, and general administrative purposes.
Minor property damage and one student injury during the course of the
occupation heightened campus tensions. The occupation was ended at
the end of the day after the Afro-American Society and President Hallo-
well signed a memorandum of understanding containing many terms
proposed by the university. 4  The memorandum provided that two
additional minority group workers would be hired the next day, raising
the total to thirteen out of ninety-nine. The two blacks to be hired im-
mediately would fill night watchmen positions which Volpe had earlier
agreed to provide. The university agreed "to continue to insist" that
enough minority group workers be hired within seven days to comprise
twenty percent of the work force and that the percentage be maintained.
It agreed to hire a "clerk of the works . . . to monitor the quality and
substance of the work," relying on the Afro-American Society "to pro-
duce candidates and giving those candidates first preference for the
position." The Afro-American Society would select a student monitor
to assist the clerk. The students at first insisted that the student monitor
be consulted prior to the discharge of any minority group worker. The
university's impotence in dealing with its contractor convinced negotia-
tors that it could only agree to "consult" the student monitor when it
learned of any firing. The memorandum of understanding, bearing
phrases like the "University will begin negotiations" or "will insist,"
recognized the university's lack of power to make the changes demanded
by students, however violent their demonstrations.
5. The Outcome
On November 13 the Building and Construction Trades Council
issued a news release stating that: "[U]nion hiring procedures shall
be strictly enforced. [The Council] will not be a party to any quota
system, on any job, in any area. Court action will be sought against
any employer who attempts to implement such a system." "5 Although
the proportion of minority group workers rose to thirteen out of a
declining force of ninety by November 18, only one minority group
worker was employed by any of the subcontractors, whose work force
would increase as Volpe's decreased. The work force declined to
9 4 Memorandum of Understanding Between Burton C. Hallowell, Pres., Tufts
Univ., and George Cox, Charles Yancey, & Dan Coleman, representatives, Tufts
Univ. Afro-American Soc'y, Nov. 12, 1969, copy on file at Office of Pres., Tufts Univ.
!5 Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metropolitan Dist. of Boston, News
Release, Nov. 13, 1969.
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sixty-three by December 8, with eight workers from minority groups.
The number of minority group workers declined at a faster rate than
the work force. On January 5 there were only five minority group
workers left out of a total work force of fifty-two, and only one was
employed by a subcontractor.
On December 5 the Middlesex Superior Court issued an interlocu-
tory decree on Volpe's demurrer and subsequently dismissed the uni-
versity's suit for declaratory relief without opinion and without leave
to amend.' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ultimately
reviewed this dismissal and ordered that the case be heard on its
merits.' But that court's action took place more than a year after the
lower court's ruling, and months after the completion of the dormitory.
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination held a
formal hearing to investigate the complaint of the Haitian bricklayers on
December 10, but made no findings and issued no order for the rehiring
of the workers.
Secretary Shultz answered the university presidents' letter on Jan-
uary 15, 1970:
Although we have done some preliminary interviewing for the
purpose of formulating a compliance program for the Boston
area, we are still hopeful that the industry and the minority
community will solve the problem themselves.
If a home town solution is not forthcoming, however, it is our
intention to resolve the problem with a Federal program. You
may be assured that before such a program is finalized, a public
hearing will be conducted to solicit relevant information from
all segments of the community-including the academic com-
munities.
98
By April 1970, the HUD investigation of Volpe had not yet
produced results. The facts would not allow a finding of compliance,
IUD had not achieved it by conciliation, and no notice for a hearing
had yet issued.
C. Disruption at Harvard
By mid-November the Tufts crisis subsided and the agitation
moved to Harvard. The dispute began over the wages and seniority
status of black helpers on the painting crew in Harvard's Buildings and
16 Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Constr. Co., Civil No. 30415 (Middlesex
Super. Ct., Dec. 19, 1969), rev'd, M-7379 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Dec. 8, 1970).
97Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Constr. Co., M-7379 (Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct., Dec. 8, 1970).
98 Letter from George P. Shultz, Sec'y of Labor, to Burton C. Hallowell, Pres.,
Tufts Univ., Jan. 15, 1970, on file at Office of the Pres., Tufts Univ. Eventually a
"hometown solution" was privately negotiated. This "Boston plan" is discussed at
text accompanying note 281 infra.
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Grounds Department. Ironically, Harvard had recruited those men
mainly to expand and upgrade minority group employment.
The dispute, however, quickly encompassed the entire range of
university employment practices, particularly those affecting several
current construction projects. On November 18 the Harvard black
student association, the Organization of Black Unity (OBU), a number
of whose members had been active in the Tufts affair, made demands
strikingly similar to those made at Tufts. The Harvard students
adopted the twenty percent minimum for minority group employment
and a number of ancillary provisions, including the student monitor
suggestion. In addition, the students demanded that a Worker's
Defense League training program be implemented at all university
construction sites.9D
The university, negotiating through law school Professor Archi-
bald Cox, rejected the students' twenty percent demand:
First, the demand is that Harvard promise discrimination
in employment. There is no justification for promising black
and other non-white workers 20 per cent of the construction
jobs, even though a target equal to the proportion of black
and other minority workers in the local area is justified. The
non-white proportion in the Boston metropolitan area, accord-
ing to the 1960 census, is 3.4 per cent of the total population.
The non-white population of Boston and Cambridge, accord-
ing to the same source, is 9.3 per cent. . . . Granting that
some upwards adjustment may be appropriate because of
population changes since 1960, and also the omission of some
Puerto Ricans, still the proportion does not come anywhere
near to 20 per cent. Accession to the demand would there-
fore involve gross and seemingly illegal discrimination.
Second, Harvard cannot promise a 20 per cent figure now,
because the promise cannot be performed. Harvard does not
control the hiring on construction projects or the conditions
imposed by labor unions upon admission to the trade.
Harvard has no power to interfere with the contractor's
practices upon existing projects. Even in letting new con-
struction contracts, the University's bargaining power is
limited because of the many times larger volume of construc-
tion elsewhere in the area.
In addition, men with the necessary skills are not pres-
ently available. They can be trained, and the University is
energetically supporting training programs.' 0
99 See Harvard Univ. News Office, Statement by Harvard University Regarding
Discussions with the Organization for Black Unity 2, Dec. 2, 1969 (commentary
explaining Harvard's point-by-point response to OBU & the Harvard-Radcliffe Ass'n
of African & Afro-Am. Students demands).
:09 Harvard Univ., Press Release, Dec. 15, 1969.
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The students remained adamant. On December 11, demonstrators
occupied University Hall, a central administration building, for the
third time since the controversy began. The university obtained a
court order against the occupation and ultimately disciplined some of
the students involved. It also retained Mr. Clifford Alexander, former
Director of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to par-
ticipate in the negotiation of university construction contracts, and
authorized him to veto any contract in which the contractor's affirma-
tive action program did not meet with his approval.
In this context Harvard contracted with Jackson Construction
Company for an addition to its Music Building. Instead of incor-
porating the general language of Executive Order 11246 in the con-
tract, Harvard established nineteen to twenty-three percent as the
range for the minimum minority group employment. Harvard's re-
sults provide an illuminating basis of comparison for the Tufts
strategy.
III. POSTCONTRACTUAL COMPLIANCE EFFORTS
The Tufts case study demonstrates the university's practical diffi-
culties in trying to eradicate racial imbalance among the workers on
its construction projects after the contracts have been awarded and
work started. Tufts tried various methods to correct problems on its
dormitory project with meager success. Its postcontractual efforts for
integration raise also the question of legal remedies available to a
university after awarding a construction contract which merely in-
corporates the equal employment opportunity clauses required by
Executive Order 11246. Both the scope of the contractor's duty under
the Order and judicial or administrative enforcement of that duty need
be considered.
A. The Scope of the Contractor's Duty Under
Executive Order 11246
Executive Order 11246 imposes upon the contractor the obligation
"not [to] discriminate against any employee or applicant for employ-
ment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"; the
contractor must "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and employees are treated during employment without re-
gard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." ' The
Tufts controversy dramatically demonstrates the present confusion over
the scope of this duty. Volpe's affirmative action program, although




preliminarily approved by HUD, and although specifying numerous
procedural steps for the appointment of an equal employment oppor-
tunity officer, posting of notices, and notification of minority groups,
failed to provide standards for measuring the effective implementation
of this obligation. The particularity of the procedures enabled Volpe
to argue that it had complied under the Executive Order simply by
following such procedures, despite continued racial imbalance in the
work force. Tufts, in turn, argued that this racial imbalance was
evidence of noncompliance. Tufts forced the issue by filing suit for a
declaratory judgment finding the general contractor in violation of the
equal employment opportunity clause.
1. Administrative Construction and Implementation of the
Contractor's Duty Under Executive Order 11246
The most obvious sources of elucidation of the contractor's duty
under Executive Order 11246 are the agencies charged with its
enforcement. Unfortunately, the rules in effect during the Tufts
controversy set no more specific standards for judging compliance than
Volpe's affirmative action program.
Neither Executive Order 10925, which introduced the "affirma-
tive action" phrase, 10 2 nor the current Executive Order 11246 explain
the term. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity (PCEEO), established by President Kennedy's 1961 Order,
promulgated a set of rules which contain no description of the nature
of the obligation.' These rules were superseded on July 1, 1968 by
the new OFCC rules which provide:
(a) Requirements of [affirmative action compliance]
programs. Each agency or applicant shall require each prime
contractor . . . and each prime contractor and subcontractor
shall require each subcontractor . . . to develop a written
affirmative action compliance program for each of its estab-
lishments. A necessary prerequisite to the development of a
satisfactory affirmative action program is the identification
and analysis of problem areas inherent in minority employ-
ment and an evaluation of opportunities for utilization of
minority group personnel. The contractor's program shall
provide in detail for specific steps to guarantee equal employ-
ment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs of mem-
bers of minority groups, including, when there are defi-
ciencies, the development of specific goals and time tables
for the prompt achievement of full and equal employment
opportunity. . ..
102 Exec. Order No. 10,925 § 301(1), 3 C.F.R. 449-50 (Comp. 1959-63).
3.0328 Fed. Reg. 9812, 11305 (1963).
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(b) Utilization evaluation. The evaluation of utiliza-
tion of minority group personnel shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of minority group representation
in all job categories.
(2) An analysis of hiring practices for the past
year, including recruitment sources and testing, to deter-
mine whether equal employment opportunity is being
afforded in all job categories.
(3) An analysis of upgrading, transfer and pro-
motion for the past year to determine whether equal
employment opportunity is being afforded."°
Although the contractor must set goals and devise timetables, the
regulations nowhere define the ultimate objective of "equal employ-
ment opportunity." Agency elaborations of these vague requirements
offer little help.1 °5 For example, HUD's Instructions for Contractors
Regarding Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11246 were
applicable in the Tufts situation. This document, like Volpe's affirma-
tive action program, merely requires that the contractor appoint an
equal employment opportunity officer, develop an equal employment
opportunity program, and recruit from minority groups. 06
2. Implications of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
for the Scope of the Contractor's Duty
The absence of internal administrative standards for judging the
scope of the contractor's duty necessitates a search for standards
outside the actual confines of the Order. In particular, because the
Executive Order focuses on the terms "discrimination" and "affirma-
tive action," it is appropriate to investigate the use of the identical terms
in title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." 7
104 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1970).
105 Although Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 201, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C.
§2000e (Supp. V, 1970) vests primary rulemaking authority in the Secretary of
Labor, the head of each contracting agency must "prescribe regulations for the
administration of the order" and for the observance of the OFCC implementing
regulations. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.6(c) (1970).
106 U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Form No. 907, Instructions
for Contractors Regarding Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, July
1967.
10742 U.S.C. §§2000e to e-15 (1964). Relying on the principle established by
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), it has been argued
that the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 preempted executive power in the
field of employment discrimination. See Remmert, Executive Order 11,246: Executive
Encroachment, 55 A.B.A.J. 1037 (1969). The Youngstown case established the
general principle that, if Congress in comprehensive legislation expressly or impliedly
declines to grant the President the authority to deal with a given matter, the Presi-
dent exceeds the constitutional limits of his power when he nevertheless attempts to
exercise the denied authority by executive order. Although Executive Order 11246
cannot require conduct which would itself violate title VII, Congress probably did
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a. The Meaning of "Discrimination" Under Title VII
Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.0 8
By making it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire,"
to "otherwise discriminate" against an individual, or to "limit, segre-
gate or classify" employees to "deprive or tend to deprive" individuals
of employment opportunities or otherwise "adversely affect" their
status as employees because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, the title manifests an intention to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms."°9 Although early judicial decisions under
the Act were somewhat inconsistent,"0 more recent cases "I have estab-
lished a two-step analysis in considering a challenge to a particular
not intend to preempt totally executive power to deal with equal employment oppor-
tunity, because the Act itself specifically refers to the concurrent existence of execu-
tive orders: § 709(d), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(d) (1964) (employer subject to executive
order recordkeeping requirements not required to file additional reports with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission); §716(c), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-15 (1964)
(PCEEO specifically named as agency to be invited to conferences convened to
familiarize affected groups with rights and obligations created by the Act). See also
110 CONG. REc. 13652 (1964) (defeat of "Tower Amendment" which would have
made title VII preempt executive power).
10842 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1964). A similar prohibition with respect to unions
is set out in § 703(c), 42 U.S.C. §20OOe-2(c) (1964).
109 Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1598, 1612 (1969) ; see Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RuTGRr s L. REv. 465, 472-75 (1968).
110 Compare Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969) and Dobbins v. Local 212, Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1968) and Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968),
with United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968) and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968), modified, 420 F.2d
1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970) and United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mo. 1968), rev'd, 416 F2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969).
Il' See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
399 U.S. 926 (1970) ; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Washington v. Baugh Constr. Co., 61
CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9346 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
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employment practice: "first, a determination of the racial impact of the
practice, and second, a determination whether any significant adverse
racial impact that exists can be adequately justified by non-racial
considerations." 112
For example, in Local 189, Papermakers v. United States,"3 the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court finding that a seniority and
promotional system, although ostensibly based on neutral criteria,
violated the Act because past discrimination by the company barring
black employees from the seniority unit made the present operation
discriminatory. Judge Wisdom summarized the unanimous court's
conclusions:
(1) Crown's [the company] job seniority system carries
forward the discriminatory effects integral to the company's
former employment practices. (2) The safe and efficient
operation of the Bogalusa mill does not depend upon mainte-
nance of the job seniority system. (3) To the extent that
Crown and the white union insisted upon carrying forward
exclusion of a racially-determined class, without business
necessity, they committed, with the requisite intent, in the
statutory sense, an unfair employment practice as defined by
Title VII." 4
The court similarly eschewed a test based on the employer's state of
mind; Judge Wisdom emphasized the impact of the challenged action
rather than the purpose behind it." 5 The cause of the disadvantage
thus does not seem to be determinative." 6 Whether grounded in a
112 Cooper & Sobol, suepra note 109, at 1671. This test was articulated by the
authors prior to most of the decisions cited in note 111 supra.
13 416 F2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
114 Id. at 997 (emphasis in original).
115 The court reasoned:
Here . . . the conduct engaged in had racially-determined effects. The
requisite intent may be inferred from the fact that defendants persisted in
the conduct after its racial implications had become known to them. Section
707(a) demands no more.
Id.
116 Most of the cases decided under title VII, however, have concerned depri-
vations caused by past or present employer or union motives that are explicitly
discriminatory. On the other hand, the court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d
1225 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970), seems to have distinguished
between such deprivations and deprivations caused by societal discrimination. There
the evidence showed that the company had explicitly discriminated against blacks in
the past by restricting them to the laborer's department. Subsequently, the company
required workers to have either a high school diploma or minimum test scores for
advancement. Blacks hired both before and after the institution of this requirement
sued. The court enjoined the'company from imposing the advancement requirement
on blacks hired prior to its institution because it perpetuated past explicit discrimina-
tion. The court refused to enjoin use of the requirement against blacks subsequently
hired despite evidence that the requirement had adverse effects on blacks as a class.
The reasoning of the court can be reconciled with the authors' proposition by reading
the decision narrowly to hold that "business necessity" justified not only tests measur-
ing "job related" skills, but also tests of general ability. This latter proposition was
disputed by Judge Sobeloff in his dissent, id. at 1237, and has not been universally
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prior discriminatory motive or deriving from general societal discrim-
ination either in education or housing,"" the employer's violation of
title VII should be based upon his incorporation of the disadvantage
into subsequent business decisions." 8
Executive Order 11246 should be construed consistently with
this judicial interpretation of the language and meaning of title VIi.
A contractor should be held to have violated the obligation not to
discriminate imposed by the Order if he has used employment prac-
tices that, objectively considered, adversely affect minority group
workers, unless such adverse effect can be adequately justified by non-
racial considerations.
Against this background of title VII, the prohibition of contractor
discrimination imposed by Executive Order 11246 assumes more
meaning. Under title VII, if a union discriminated against minority
group workers in the past and continues to recruit without giving the
minority community notice of the extinction of its discriminatory hir-
ing policies, that failure to give notice conceals job opportunities and
constitutes discrimination." 9 The same result should obtain where a
union encourages nepotism or requires sponsorship to perpetuate past
exclusion whether caused by deliberate act of the union or by the
accident of social segregation. 2 ° Thus, for the purposes of the Ex-
ecutive Order, a contractor who hires predominantly through union
hiring" halls, even though minority group referral organizations exist,
could be held to be utilizing a discriminatory employment practice if
the hiring hall excludes minority group workers by one of the above
methods.' 21
accepted. See Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 61 CCH Lab. Cas.
9375 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 1969) (general aptitude test for municipal employment held
unconstitutional because culturally biased). Moreover, recent cases have drawn no
distinction between the causes of the deprivation. E.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems,
Inc., 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 119485 (C.D. Cal. 1970) ("no arrest record" requirement
held violative of title VII because blacks arrested more frequently than whites).
117 Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (refusal to approve
voter literacy test under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because of the inherent
inferiority of education in segregated schooling).
118 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 109, at 1669-73.
"1
9 See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F2d 123, 137-40
(8th Cir. 1969).
120 See Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th
Cir. 1969). See also Blumrosen, supra note 109, at 476-79; Kaplan, Equal Justice in
an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment,
61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 368-69 (1966).
121 Cf. SovaiRu, supra note 40, at 154. The Department of Labor now takes this
view. In its recent "Philadelphia Plan" the Department states that if a contractor
fails to meet minority employment goals "[i]t is no excuse that the union with which
the contractor has a collective bargaining agreement failed to refer minority em-
ployees." 2 CCH EMP. PRAc. GuIDE- 116,175, at 7153 (June 27, 1969). See also
Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E2d 907
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
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Volpe's hiring practices may well have violated this standard:
certainly a statistical imbalance in the work force has probative weight
in such a determination.
2
b. The Meaning of "Affirmative Actioie' Under Title VII
In other contexts "affirmative action" has come to mean remedial
action to overcome the effects of a specific evil."2  Title VII also em-
ploys the term in its remedial sense. Section 706(g) provides that,
once a violation is found, the courts not only may enjoin that violation,
but may "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 124
This provision has provided a mandate to the courts to insist on cor-
rective devices that not only eliminate future discrimination, but also
remedy the effects of past discrimination. For example, in Local 53,
Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler,1 25 the district court found that the
union local had engaged in exclusionary and nepotistic policies which
discriminated on the grounds of race and national origin. To correct
the adverse effects of these practices, the district court ordered a system
of "alternating white and negro referrals" until objective referral
procedures could be devised and implemented. Affirming, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the relief was appropriate "affirmative action" to
eliminate the present effects of past discrimination and to prevent
future discrimination.1 26 Similarly, in Washington v. Baugh Con-
struction Co.,' 7 in which the evidence suggested that the unions had
refused to refer minority group workers to a contractor engaged in
university construction, the court ordered the unions to refer minority
group workers presented by the university and to begin implementing
an "apprenticeship outreach" program which was being established in
122 Proof largely dependent upon probabilities has been accepted by the Supreme
Court in both the jury -selection and school cases. E.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S.
404 (1967) ; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967). Estimation of how many of a
district's blacks meet the relatively simple standards imposed upon jurors, however,
is far easier than calculation of the number of blacks in an area competent to perform
jobs of a certain difficulty. Recognizing this problem, several recent cases have
nevertheless sanctioned the use of statistics in demonstrating employment discrimina-
tion. E.g., EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189, 62 CCII Lab. Cas. 119434 (S.D. Ohio
1970); Penn v. Stumpf, 62 CCH Lab. Cas. 19404 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Dobbins v.
Local 212, Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 445 (S.D. Ohio 1968). See also
Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
32 U. CHi. L. REv. 430 (1965).
123 See, e.g., NLRB v. Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 393 U.S. 357 (1969)
(construing National Labor Relations Act §10(c), 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1964));
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (construing the same provision).
In the area of school desegregation, a recent case has held that the states are consti-
tutionally compelled "to take affirmative action to reorganize their school systems by
integrating the students, faculties, facilities, and activities." United States v. Board
of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 862 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
12442 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1964).
125407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
1261d. at 1055.




"Affirmative action" under Executive Order 11246 should be con-
strued analogously. As long as a contractor's hiring practices are not
of themselves discriminatory, he can comply with the affirmative action
obligation simply by following the procedural guidelines promulgated
by the enforcing agency or specified in his approved affirmative action
program. But if the contractor's employment practices are found to be
discriminatory, he must not only follow those procedural requisites but
also take substantive steps to overcome the effects of the discrimination.
This will often mean employment procedures that are not strictly
colorblind.
A similar approach has been followed in those cases in which
OFCC has negotiated supplementary agreements specifically dealing
with the contractor's obligation under the Executive Order,' 9 and in
the one reported noncompliance case which has proceeded through a
hearing to a decision by the Secretary of Labor. The latter, In re
Allen-Bradley Co., 130 involved a manufacturer of electrical and elec-
tronic equipment. It had an overwhelmingly white work force, largely
the result of the discontinued practice of giving preference to applicants
who were friends and relatives of employees. The "affirmative action"
demanded by OFCC, and accepted as appropriate by the hearing panel
and the Secretary of Labor, required the company to abandon its ex-
clusive reliance on walk-in applicants for jobs, to take steps to broaden
its recruitment base by consulting employment agencies with a sub-
stantial black clientele, and to try to change its image in the black
community as a discriminatory employer.
3. Conclusion
The Tufts case study demonstrates that the insertion of an
"affirmative action" obligation in a construction contract and the
prescription of drastic sanctions for noncompliance will be ineffective
without a specific definition of compliance. Executive Order 11246
and the regulations promulgated thereunder do not by themselves
explain the obligations of a contractor. Nevertheless, examining the
context of title VII exposes a basis for imposing concrete obligations
once an enforcement agency or court has found discrimination. Hence,
although it would obviously be more desirable to prescribe specific
standards for compliance in a precontractual setting, relief might be
128 Id. at 6913.
129 See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 109, at 1630-31.
130 [Aug. 1968-Apr. 1969 Transfer Binder] CCH LAB. L. REP. 8065 (OFCC
Dec. 17, 1968), affd, [Aug. 1968-Apr. 1969 Transfer Binder] CCH LAB L. REP.
18070 (Sec'y of Labor, Jan. 16, 1969).
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possible if a university could raise the issues before an administrative
or judicial tribunal.
B. Administrative Relief
Despite the command of Executive Order 11246, backed by severe
sanctions,'' that grantees of federal construction funds "assist and
cooperate actively" with the administering agency and the Secretary
of Labor in obtaining the compliance of contractors with the obliga-
tions imposed under the Order, 3 ' the administrative process is in-
capable of responding to university action.
1. University Standing to Initiate Agency Process
a. Formal Procedures
The regulations implementing the Order place primary responsi-
bility for securing compliance upon the agency administering the
grant.133  Before a contract award can be made, the agency's contract
compliance officer must review "the available information relative to
the prospective prime contractor's equal opportunity compliance
status." 134 This initial review is necessarily confined to the past
performance of the contractor and to his ability to fulfill the nondis-
crimination and affirmative action requirements of the contract.
35
After the contract award, the "compliance agency" ' has con-
tinuing responsibility for overseeing the contractor's performance. The
regulations require the compliance agency to have a regular program
for ordinary compliance reviews as well as for reviews in response to
"any special requests or instructions of" the OFCC Director.137 There
131 A grantee failing to comply with the Order may lose both its current federal
funds and its eligibility for future federal funds. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 303(b),
3 C.F.R. 408-09 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
1
3 2 Id. § 301, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
13341 C.F.R. § 60-1.6(a) (1970).
134 Id. § 60-1.6(d) (2).
135 See id. § 60-1.29(a) (Director may request preaward compliance review to
determine whether contractor can comply with provisions of the equal opportunity
clause).
136 The Director of the OFCC selects the compliance agency on a "geographical
industry or other basis." Id. § 60-1.3(d). In the absence of a specific designation
by the Director, the compliance agency is ordinarily the grantor agency providing
the largest share of the funds for the project in question. See id. §§ 60-1.3(d)(1)-
(4).
137 Id. § 60-120(c). The compliance review is designed
to determine if the prime contractor or subcontractor maintains nondiscrimi-
natory hiring and employment practices and is taking affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are placed, trained,
upgraded, promoted, and otherwise treated during employment without regard




is no provision for grantee initiation of the compliance review process;
rather, the compliance review scheme is an administrative monitoring
mechanism which the agencies must initiate. The timing and thor-
oughness of compliance reviews are largely discretionary, exercised,
necessarily, within the limitations of the agency's staff and funds.
By contrast, the procedure for employees or applicants for employ-
ment aggrieved by discrimination is well-defined. The regulations pro-
vide that "any employee of any contractor" may file with OFCC or
the administering agency "a complaint of alleged discrimination in
violation of the equal opportunity clause." 138 Significantly, neither the
Order nor the regulations provide for grantee initiation of the complaint
process.1 39
Thus, under the formal procedures of the Executive Order, a
university as a federal grantee has no standing to initiate agency
process. A university has a right to participate in agency proceedings
only if charged with failure to fulfill its duties under the Order. 4 ' This
scheme is not unusual. Despite a general broadening of the law of
judicial standing, 4' the standing of private parties to initiate agency
action remains largely discretionary, depending upon the particular
statutory scheme. 42 Only when agency action already initiated
13SId. §60-1.21; see id. §§60-122 to -124. See also Ekcec. Order No. 11,246
§206(b), 3 C.F.R. 405 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
139 The university might rely upon a minority worker to institute action under the
Order, but if the complaint is based upon a failure to recruit minority workers
actively it may be difficult to find a worker who could convincingly allege discrimina-
tion.
Similar problems detract from the utility of instituting a complaint with EEOC
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964). Further, the EEOC procedure-which must be
exhausted before judicial action may be sought-is replete with delays and ineffective
remedies and is limited to "conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. § 2000e-5 (a).
See generally Note, Discrimination in Employment and Housing: Private Enforce-
ment Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARv. L. REv. 834
(1969) ; Comment, A Primer to Procedure and Remedy Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 31 U. PrrT. L. REv. 407 (1970). But cf. H.R. 10065, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (amendment of title VII empowering EEOC to issue cease
and desist orders and to order appropriate "affirmative action").
An alternative procedure, also dependent upon initiation by a minority complainant,
would require an allegation of a violation of the duty of fair representation under
the National Labor Relations Act. See NLRA §§ 8(b) (1) (A), (b) (2), (b) (3),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (1) (A), (b) (2), (b) (3) (1964) ; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967) (fair representation before the courts); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966) ; Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally SOVERN, supra note 40, at 143-75. A
more novel approach to employee complaint coverage under the NLRA was recently
sanctioned in United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1969), in which the court held racial discrimination to be a per se violation of NLRA
§8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1964).
140 See Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 303(c), 3 C.F.R. 409 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(Supp. V, 1970).
141 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CH. L. REv. 450 (1970).
142 1 K. DAvis, ADA1isimAnW LAW TREAiss § 4.07 (1958) ; Jaffe, The Indi-
vidual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IowA L. REv. 485 (1940).
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threatens adverse consequences does a party have a right to a hearing
in the agency proceedings. 43
Although OFCC or the compliance agency should have discretion
in determining whether to act,' the Order and regulations should be
modified to permit grantee initiation of agency process. The grantee's
obligation to "assist and cooperate actively" with the administering
agency cannot be fulfilled if the grantee has no effective way to secure
contractor compliance. And a grantee in Tufts' position certainly has
an interest in contractor compliance when faced with the disruption
of its construction by students or labor.
Rather than seek direct administrative intervention against the
contractor for noncompliance, the university could pursue alternative
relief under the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking or declara-
tory order provisions. Section 4(e) insists that every agency give any
"interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment,
or repeal of a rule." ' The university might seek concrete compliance
standards for the affected area, modeled, for example, after the Phila-
delphia Plan.146 But an agency need not act on a petition under section
4(e), and even then section 4(a) exempts from section 4(e) any
"matter relating . . . to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." 17
The declaratory order "to . . . remove uncertainty" authorized
by section 5 (d) '4' promises easier relief. As opposed to a proceeding
by an administrative complaint against the contractor, the university's
posture in seeking a declaratory order seems sufficient to satisfy agency
standing.'49 Viewing the declaratory order as an administrative
parallel to a declaratory judgment,3 0 the university can characterize its
143 See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
144 See Jaffe, supra note 142, at 530.
1455 U.S.C. § 553(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
146 Text accompanying notes 216-27 infra.
1475 U.S.C. § 553 (a) (2). See generally Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal
Ruleinaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970).
1485 U.S.C. § 554(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
149 See id. The section applies only in cases of "adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 554 (a).
Although there is no statutory requirement of adjudication in the case of determina-
tions of grantee compliance with Executive Order 11246, the Order does provide that
"[i]n no case shall action [imposing administrative sanctions] be taken with respect
to an applicant . . . without notice and opportunity for hearing before the admin-
istering department or agency." Exec. Order No. 11,246 §303(c), 3 C.F.R. 409
(1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970). And it has been held that the Order
"is to be accorded the force and effect of statutory law." United States v. United
Papermakers & Paperworkers Local 189, 282 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d
629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
150 The American Bar Association, through its Subcommittee on Declaratory
Orders of its Administrative Process Committee, has stated that declaratory orders
are a useful and obvious administrative parallel to declaratory judgments. Comment,




request as a defense to an anticipated action against it by the agency
for failure to assure nondiscrimination and affirmative action on its
construction project.
The status and availability of declaratory orders are uncertain in
most agencies,'" including OFCC, and their utility is questionable. The
issuance of such orders is in the sound discretion of the agency con-
cerned,"52 and in the absence of OFCC rules for declaratory orders, a
grantee cannot know what facts or circumstances would appeal to its
discretion or to the compliance agency's. More significantly, enter-
tainment of the request would not necessarily afford the university the
relief it desires. The agency can avoid the university's problem by
continuing funding without investigating possible violations by the
contractor. Such a result would not satisfy students agitating for
more minority group employment and would not further the uni-
versity's ultimate goal of integrating the construction industry.
b. Informal Procedures
Despite the problems in formal initiation of agency process, the
Tufts experience indicates it is not difficult to trigger the initial investi-
gatory phase of a compliance review by informal request. But this
procedure is haphazard at best, and the Tufts case study shows how
difficult it is to expedite the investigation and to require the agency to
make findings constituting a basis for a formal hearing. HUD investi-
gators assured the university that the entire procedure could be con-
cluded, through the hearing stage to final determination, within 120
days of the start of the investigation. Nevertheless, although HUD
responded promptly to the request for a compliance review, its investi-
gation languished from mid-November until the project was completed
in early July. No findings were ever issued nor was a formal con-
ciliation process undertaken, although the investigation itself evidently
exerted indirect pressure on the contractor to recruit more vigorously
among minority groups.15
2. The Inadequacy of Agency Process
Even though a university may be able to initiate agency process
informally, the inadequacy of that process prevents effective enforce-
ment. Both formally and informally initiated compliance proceedings
begin with an investigation by the agency with "primary responsibility"
for compliance." 4 Although cancellation of present funding and in-
151 Id. 258-62.
1525 U.S.C. § 554(e) (Supp. V, 1970). The ABA subcommittee supported the
passage of S. 518, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(k) (1967), which provided for mandatory
agency action on petitions for declaratory orders. Comment, supra note 150, at 264.
153 From November 4 to November 18, the number of black workers increased
from 7 out of a work force of 99 to 13 out of a work force of 90.
15 4 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-124(b) (1970).
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eligibility for future funding are the ultimate sanctions, 5 the Order
provides informal procedures-"conference, conciliation, mediation, or
persuasion"-as the preferred means for securing compliance. 58 The
regulations state that when an agency's investigation indicates the
existence of an apparent violation of the nondiscrimination provisions,
"the matter should be resolved by informal means whenever pos-
sible." '57 Informal resolution is ultimately reviewable by the OFCC
Director, 5 " but he may also assume jurisdiction at any stage of an
agency proceeding, whether formal or informal, when he considers it
"necessary or appropriate to the achievement of the purposes of the
Order." 159
The overlapping of this concurrent jurisdiction has created con-
fusion rather than rigorous enforcement. The grantee does not know
which agency to consult at any particular stage of the proceeding;""
the contractor is uncertain of its contractual obligations because OFCC
and other agencies' standards for affirmative action may differ; ' and
the agencies themselves seem impelled to pass on responsibility.
The decision to vest primary responsibility in the grantor agency
is of doubtful wisdom. Tone, rigor, and specificity of the affirmative
action program depend primarily on the initial review. Yet the grantor
agency is basically interested in implementing its construction program.
From its point of view, the nondiscrimination objectives of the Order
are secondary, while delays and other problems potentially resulting
from the cancellation of a contract make the agency reluctant to impose
sanctions.' The result is often an ineffective affirmative action pro-
gram like Volpe's.
Finally, the very severity of the sanction of cancellation of funding
insures its infrequent use. Aside from a reluctance to punish con-
tractors so harshly, the Govermnent will hesitate to cause delay in
155Exec. Order No. 11,246 §§209(a)(5)-(6), 3 C.F.R. 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C.
§2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
156Id. §209(b), 3 C.F.R. 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
157 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.24(c) (2) (1970).
158Id. §§ 60-1.24(c)( 1)-(2). The Director's authority is delegated to him by
the Secretary of Labor, who is ultimately responsible for compliance with the Order.
Exec. Order No. 11,246 §201, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V,
1970).
15941 C.F.R. § 60-125 (1970).
160 Tufts experienced this confusion when it first attempted to contact the appro-
priate regional office. The agencies sent a team of OFCC and HUD officials and
even used an HEW compliance officer from Boston. For a discussion of confusion
created in other areas by multi-agency control, see Rodgers, The Persistent Problem
of the Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70 CoLum. L. REV. 567
(1970).
161 Compare U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Form No. 907,
Instructions for Contractors Regarding Affirmative Action Under Executive Order
11246, July 1967, with 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40 to -1.42 (1970).
162 See Note, supra note 1, at 602-03. See also Jones, Federal Contract Com-
pliance in Phase I-The Dawning of the Age of Enforcement of Equal Employment
Obligations, 4 GA. L. REV. 756 (1970).
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needed construction, blacklist large contractors whose services are
required, or injure workers by indirectly depriving them of employ-
ment. The enforcement agencies are forced to rely upon informal
settlement encouraging both long delays as experienced by Tufts,
and "soft settlements." 163
With inadequate staff,"0 4 even the best administrative scheme must
fail to provide meaningful enforcement in terms of a significant increase
in the number of minority group workers in construction. The present
administrative arrangement compounds the staffing problems. Un-
equivocal provision for grantee standing, consolidation of enforcement
activities in OFCC, and perhaps a broader range of sanctions would
at least on paper constitute an effective scheme pending the supple-
mentation of existing funds for staff. Meanwhile, a university can
only attempt to obtain judicial relief.
C. Judicial Relief
The interests of a university attempting to enforce the contractor's
duties under Executive Order 11246 are dissimilar from those of the
usual plaintiff in a contract action. A plaintiff normally asserts that
the defendant owes him an unfulfilled duty and demands satisfaction
of that duty through damages or equitable relief. But the contractor's
unfulfilled duty is at best only indirectly owed to the university. The
primary beneficiaries of the contractor's duties under the Order are the
minority group workers, and they will not be parties to the litigation."'6
Thus the university faces two difficult tasks. First, it must characterize
its legal interest under the Order to give it standing to sue the parties
capable of either fulfilling or enforcing the duties specified in the Order.
Second, the university must demand a form of relief which will benefit
not only its own interests but also those of the minority group workers.
1. Action Against the Agency
Executive Order 11246 charges the government agency adminis-
tering the federal funds for the project with primary responsibility for
163 Cf. Sov~aa, sipra note 40, at 48.
164During the Tufts controversy, OFCC had no compliance officers in New
England and only one in New York.
165 Institution of judicial action under the Order on behalf of minority group
workers allegedly discriminated against would be infeasible. First, the university
would have to find workers who could allege discrimination. Those workers must
exhaust their administrative remedies under procedures outlined by OFCC. 41 C.F.R.
§§60-1.21 to -1.32 (1970). This involves significant delay, undercutting the possi-
bility of gaining an order affecting the contractor's practices on the construction in
question. Second, even if administrative procedures could be exhausted with sufficient
speed, courts have held that a worker alleging discrimination fails to state a cause of
action against the contractor because the administrative remedies are available and
the agency action final. See, e.g., Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 633
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967), discussed at text accompanying note
204 infra. Similar difficulties would exist in a title VII action on behalf of minority
workers. See note 139 supra.
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compliance. 6 Thus a university's first logical step in an effort to
enforce the Order is to attempt to compel the agency to fulfill its
responsibilities.
The available judicial action, however, will not place the university
in an adversary position relative to the government agency regarding
the agency's duty to obtain the contractor's compliance. Although the
federal district courts have jurisdiction over actions to compel a federal
agency to perform its duty, that jurisdiction exists only when the duty
in question is owed to the plaintiff.16 7  Because the Order is intended
to benefit primarily minority group workers and because no provision
is made for grantee initiation of complaints of contractor noncompli-
ance,1 6 8 a court is likely to find that the agency's duty to obtain con-
tractor compliance is owed solely to the minority group workers. Thus
the university cannot utilize this mandamus jurisdiction.
The university can place itself in an adversary relationship with
the agency only with respect to issues peripheral to the agency's en-
forcement duty. The university can, for example, sue for a declaratory
judgment 169 that it had fulfilled its obligation to "assist and cooperate
actively" with the agency in obtaining the contractor's compliance 1"0
and hence is entitled to payment of its grant. But the doctrines of
ripeness 171 and sovereign immunity' 72 would probably render such an
166 Fxec. Order No. 11,246 §§301-04, 3 C.F.R. 407-09 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e
(Supp. V, 1970).
16728 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
168Text accompanying notes 137-43 supra. Both Exec. Order No. 11,246 §206
(b), 3 C.F.R. 405 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970) and the regulations
implementing the Order, 41 C.F.R. §60-1.21 (1970), provide only for employee
initiation of complaints of discrimination against contractors.
16928 U.S.C. §2201 (1964).
170 Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 301, 3 C.F.R. 407 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp.
V, 1970).
171 There are several tests for ripeness within the declaratory judgment context.
The university obviously fails to meet the most stringent standard, the accrual of a
coercive cause of action to one of the parties with respect to the contested issue.
Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787,
794 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. No coercive action has accrued to
the university because it has not been denied funds. Nor has an action accrued to
the agency, for it is required by the Executive Order to grant opportunity for a
hearing before stopping payment. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §303(c), 3 C.F.R. 409
(1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970). Moreover, it is questionable whether
the contemplated litigation even meets the more liberal standard of relative certainty
that coercive litigation will eventually ensue between the same parties. Developments
794. In similar situations, actions have been held premature when the defendant did
not actually threaten to bring a judicial action. See Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333
U.S. 426 (1948) (no indication that defendant would exercise its alleged right to
expel petitioner from Federal Reserve System) ; Developments 795.
172 For jurisdictional purposes, declaratory actions are judged by the form of the
action which would necessarily be brought were the declaratory procedures unavail-
able. In this case the coercive form of the declaratory suit would be an action to
compel payment of the grant. But sovereign immunity traditionally bars actions
against officials for specific relief. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-05 (1949); H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1177 (1953).
The possibility of avoiding the sovereign immunity difficulty through an action
under a special statutory exemption is slight. The amount of the university's potential
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action nonjusticiable. Even if the suit were allowed and judgment
awarded to the university, the university would not necessarily gain
the desired relief. The agency could frustrate the university's objective
of increasing minority employment by conceding that the university
was entitled to payment, without initiating an investigation of the
contractor.
2. Action Against the Contractor
Judicial action against the contractor raises several strategic issues.
The university should first consider whether the initiation of judicial
action or taking the stronger step of suspending construction and de-
fending against the contractor's action for damages by raising the
claim of contractor noncompliance is more effective. The black stu-
dents at Tufts suggested suspension, and most student bodies would
probably support such direct action enthusiastically. But the liabilities
of suspension almost surely outweigh the potential public relations
benefits. The university's building program would be delayed, denying
it necessary facilities and exposing it to the risk of higher construction
costs in the future. More important, the university would lack prece-
dential support in defending the contractor's damages suit. Standards
for determining noncompliance with the Order are ill-defined. Even
if the university could prove contractor noncompliance, a court might
still hold that such noncompliance did not sufficiently impair the value
of the contract so as to justify suspension of the entire contract by
the university." 3 Moreover, failure in such a suit would greatly in-
crease the eventual costs of the construction. Hence, absent further
judicial or administrative clarification of the law under the Order,
suspension of the construction is ill-advised.
claim against the agency creates the problem. The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction
to the district courts for claims against the United States founded upon any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964). But unless the university has already
been paid a large portion of the agency grant, the amount in question would almost
surely exceed the Tucker Act's $10,000 limitation. This would remit the university
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the statute granting it jurisdiction
"to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded . . . upon
a . . any regulation of an executive department . . . ." Id. § 1491. This remission
deprives the university of its cause of action, however, because the Supreme Court
has recently relied on the historical restriction of Court of Claims remedies to money
judgments to deny that court jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments. United
States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969). Hence, a statutory exemption from the sovereign
immunity bar appears unavailable.
173
Although breach to any extent of any promise in a contract gives rise
to a cause of action . . . a slight breach will not necessarily end further
duties of the injured person for the performance of the contract.
11 S. WI..IsToN, TREATISE 0T THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1292, at 8 (3rd ed. 1968).
Because the contractual provisions imposed by the Order are not bargained for by
either the contractor or the university, text following note 200 infra, and because they
are intended to benefit minority group workers rather than the parties to the contract,
a court would probably find that a contractor's noncompliance with them was a"slight breach" not justifying termination by the university.
19701
132 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The university, however, can avoid the risk of potential liability.
Instead of suspending work and becoming the defendant in the con-
tractor's ensuing action for damages, the university can take the posi-
tion of a plaintiff by demanding declaratory and equitable relief. The
university might, for example, join an action for a declaratory judg-
ment regarding the contractor's compliance with a demand for equitable
relief " in the form of an injunction against further racial discrimina-
tion and of specific performance of the contractor's affirmative action
duty as defined by the title VII analogiesY Even though the equitable
relief were denied, a favorable declaratory judgment might indirectly
support subsequent demands for changes in the contractor's employ-
ment policies or might provide a basis for suspension of the project.
The prayer for declaratory relief might be phrased in several ways.
The university can request a declaration that the contractor's actions
did not meet the specifications of Executive Order 11246 as embodied
in the contract. Or, to test its right to take more drastic measures, it
could request a declaration that it would not violate the contract by
suspending work for the contractor's failure to meet its obligations.
Another strategic problem is deciding whether to bring suit in
state or federal court. A federal court appears to be more appropriate
for adjudicating standards under an ambiguous executive order, and
declaratory procedures may be unavailable in the courts of certain
states. But difficult jurisdictional problems may ultimately deny fed-
eral jurisdiction and preclude effective relief. In any event, a state
court must enforce any duty under federal law actually owed to the
university." For purposes of the discussion in this Article, however,
the university will be assumed to have chosen the federal forum, thus
avoiding the peculiar procedural rules of any given state and providing
the analysis with as wide an application as possible.
a. Federal Jurisdiction
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act states that
[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
. . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.'
7 7
The Act's requirement of an "actual controversy" and "jurisdiction"
points out two issues raised by the proposed litigation.
17428 U.S.C. §2202 (1964) (other remedies may be coupled with declaratory
relief).
15 These analogies are developed in the text accompanying notes 107-30 supra.
17
6 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).




The university's suit for declaratory relief regarding its rights
against the contractor should be found to satisfy the test of justiciability
requiring "relative certainty of ultimate coercive litigation." 17s If the
university sought a declaration that suspension of work on the project
would not violate the contract, ultimate coercive litigation would be
relatively certain at least in one sense, because suspension would almost
surely result in an action for damages against the university. But the
university must also demonstrate its actual intent to suspend the con-
tract for the contractor's noncomplianceY 9
Although difficult to prove, the university's intent is not merely
hypothetical. Committed by contract and perhaps by its public state-
ments to the goal of increasing minority group employment and under
pressure from its students to further that goal, the university has the
requisite intent to engage in a "definite, proposed course of conduct" 1SO
-suspension of the contract for noncompliance. Its unwillingness to
act in the absence of a declaratory order defining the probable legal
consequences of a suspension should not preclude the granting of
declaratory relief, for the university should not be forced to act at its
peril to secure compliance with the contract."'
(ii) "Within its Jurisdiction"
(a) Amount in Controversy
To base jurisdiction on either diversity of citizenship ' 8 2 or the
existence of a federal question 18 3 requires that the "amount in contro-
versy" exceed 10,000 dollars.
Courts look to the value of the contractual rights whose validity
is questioned to determine the amount in controversy in a declaratory
17 8 Developinents 795. See generally note 171 supra.
179
[A] declaration as to plaintiff's right to perform an act, or as to the con-
sequences of his action, is likely to be refused if a sufficiently definite intent
to perform the act has not been manifested.
Developtizents 795 (footnote omitted).
1SO
[W]here the requirements of justiciability are otherwise met, a party to
a contract should be able to secure a declaratory judgment as to the legal
effect of a definite, proposed course of conduct.
6A J. MOORE, FFDERAL. PRAcicE 1 157.12, at 3067 (2d ed. 1966) (footnote omitted).
1l8Id. 1 57.12.
18228 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). Because the requirement of diversity of citizenship
is obviously satisfied whenever the university and the contractor are from different
states, subsequent discussion deals only with the problems arising from an assertion
of federal question jurisdiction.
183 Id. § 1331.
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judgment action."s  Insofar as the university seeks a declaration that
the entire contract is invalid because of the contractor's noncompliance
with the Order, the amount in controversy should be found to exceed
10,000 dollars, as most federally funded construction contracts are
likely to involve sums substantially greater than that amount. But
an action to secure only an injunction against contractor discrimination
and specific performance of the contractor's duty of affirmative action
under the Order would satisfy the jurisdictional amount only under
certain circumstances.185
In actions for specific performance, the "value of the object to be
gained by the plaintiff" ' determines the amount in controversy. Be-
cause the contractual provisions forbidding discrimination are not
"bargained for" by the university and because they are intended to
benefit only the minority group workers, a court could readily conclude
that the actual monetary value to be gained by the university from
the contractor's compliance is less than the requisite amount. But in
actions to enjoin a contract violation threatening one party with ir-
reparable damage, courts have evidenced a willingness to look beyond
the immediate value of the contractual rights in question to the poten-
tial damages resulting from noncompliance in order to determine
whether the jurisdictional amount is satisfied. 8 7 Threatened with
student or labor disruption of its construction projects or its general
184 See Freedman v. Zurich Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 550, 551 (W.D. Pa. 1967);
Empire Box Corp. v. Willard Sulzberger Motor Co., 104 F. Supp. 762, 766 (D.N.J.
1952).
185 Assuming that the prayer for declaratory judgment satisfied the requirement
of $10,000 in controversy, a federal court would have jurisdiction to hear alternative
claims for relief arising out of the same controversy, although they did not in them-
selves satisfy the jurisdictional amount. See Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232
(1904) (Court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's alternative claims for rescission of
a contract to convey land or for an order to convey. certain land to him, although
the latter claim did not satisfy the requisite jurisdictional amount); Ridder Bros.,
Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1944) ("[I]f the federal jurisdiction is
fixed as to any part of the action, it is fixed as to the whole thereof.").
186 Peavey v. Reed Co., 41 F. Supp. 351, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (specific per-
formance of a contract for release of a tort claim) ; Comment, Federal Jurisdiction:
Amount in Controversy in Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 601,
608 (1958).
187 In an action to secure injunctive relief, the value of the right or interest
sought to be protected determines the amount in controversy. See 1 J. MOORE, supra
note 180, at 0.96, at 866-72 (injunctions against private acts). In Campbell Soup
Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952), the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
certain farmers from breaching their contracts to sell crops to the plaintiffs. Although
the court recognized that the actual value of the property in question ordinarily
determines the amount in controversy in an action for specific performance of a
sales contract, it rejected the defendants' contention that such a test denied it juris-
diction over the plaintiffs' action. Instead, it found that the plaintiffs sought to
protect "a plan of doing business and a vast system of manufacture" threatened with
irreparable damage by the defendants' breach of their contract. Id. at 214. The
court's reasoning suggests that in the proposed litigation to enjoin contractor dis-
crimination in violation of the Order the amount in controversy should be measured




operations because of a contractor's failure to fulfill his contractual
obligations, a university could easily prove potential damages from
contractor noncompliance in excess of 10,000 dollars. Thus the pro-
posed litigation would satisfy the jurisdictional amount even in the
absence of a prayer for a declaration that the entire contract was
invalid.
(b) Federal Question"l
(1) Characterization of the Complaint
To warrant jurisdiction, the federal question in the case must
arise on the face of a properly pleaded complaint rather than by way
of an anticipated defense or irrelevant background."" This require-
ment, the so-called well-pleaded complaint rule, 90 is satisfied if the
university seeks specific performance and affirmative relief, because
federal elements in such claims do not fall in the categories of antici-
pated defenses or explanatory matter. The court might decide, how-
ever, that the analogies drawn from the interpretation of "discrimina-
tion" and "affirmative action" under title VII do not provide adequate
standards by which to determine what the equitable relief should be,
and, upon appropriate motion, dismiss the prayer for specific per-
formance as failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 9'
The university would then be left with the decidedly more difficult
task of grounding federal question jurisdiction in a prayer for a
declaratory judgment.
The problem with the latter approach lies in the application of
the well-pleaded complaint rule to declaratory judgments. On the
one hand, it is possible to judge the complaint on its own merits; if
the complaint as stated relies on federal law, jurisdiction exists. The
other possibility is to use an historical test, holding that the action
can be entertained in federal court only if the underlying coercive
action might have been so brought. This test was announced in Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,'92 in which Justice Frankfurter
reasoned that testing federal question jurisdiction solely on the face
of the complaint would destroy the limited procedural purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act and permit "artful pleading" to gain juris-
diction for a suit which could not otherwise be heard in federal court.
188 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
1S9 Gully v. First Nat'1 Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936).
190 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L.
REv. 157, 176 (1953).
191 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
192339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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Application of the Skelly Oil test raises a significant obstacle to
the proposed litigation. Assuming that no specific relief was available,
a court could find that the university's federal claim arises only as a
defense to the contractor's potential state action for damages. The
rule of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley 193 would then
apply, denying federal jurisdiction.
Although much criticized by scholars,'94 the Skelly Oil test has
never been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, disregarding the
prayer for specific performance, the pleadings would probably not be
judged on their face for purposes of determining federal question
jurisdiction and the courts would lack jurisdiction over the university's
action for a declaratory judgment.
(2) Incorporation.
The issue remains whether the complaint, even if judged on its
face rather than by the underlying coercive action, actually raises a
federal question. The action is fundamentally contractual. The uni-
versity is not suing directly on a federal right, but on federal standards
as incorporated into an agreement between private parties. The ques-
tion is whether that incorporation raises a federal question for juris-
dictional purposes.
The incorporation issue is another unsettled area of the law.
Cases are often distinguished on the basis of whether the federal law
is merely used as a standard for essentially state or contractual duties
or also operates independently. The federal interest in having the
suit adjudicated in federal court appears most significant when "the
same issues involving the same course of conduct could have been
litigated in a federal cause of action had the parties or the form of
the lawsuit only been different." 195 This analysis supports federal
193211 U.S. 149 (1908).
194 Professor Mishkin has suggested that Skelly Oil is based on a misreading of
the Court's earlier admonition that the "operation of the Declaratory Jud-ment Act
is procedural only," Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937);
that the admonition was anchored in a fear that the Act might be unconstitutional
for granting jurisdiction over cases not yet ripened into justiciable controversies
under U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; and that the applicability of the Court's reasoning
in Skelly Oil to federal question jurisdiction, where the issue is statutory rather
than constitutional, is thus questionable. Mishkin, supra note 190, at 178 n.99; see
id. 182-84 (Skelly Oil can be construed as limited to cases not "directly" founded
upon federal law). Several commentators have also suggested rejecting the test
announced in Skelly Oil and, when the issue is the existence of a federal question,
analyzing the pleadings in a declaratory action on their face. Id. 176-84; see Cohen,
The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" under Federal
Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 894-95 n.26 (1967) ; Currie, The Federal Courts and
the American Law Institute, Part 11, 36 U. CHl. L. REv. 268, 269-71 (1969). The
American Law Institute has offered similar suggestions in its proposed revision of
the Judicial Code. ALI STUDY OF THE DIVIsiox OF JURISDICTION 3ETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 24, 169-72 (1968).




jurisdiction for the university's case because the identical issues might
arise in a Government suit against the contractor.'96 Although federal
jurisdiction in such cases might be found objectionable for opening
the federal courts to numerous actions based on incorporation of federal
standards into private contracts,197 the incorporation of the provisions
in question results from federal law, not private party agreement.
Moreover, the federal requirement of incorporation emphasizes the
strong federal interest in having such claims heard in a federal court
where they are more likely to receive a sympathetic hearing and
consistent interpretation.
Judicial precedent exists for according federal jurisdiction to the
proposed litigation, assuming the complaint is analyzed on its face.
In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,'98 the Supreme Court
sustained federal jurisdiction over a stockholder's suit to enjoin direc-
tors from investing in federal farm loan bonds on the ground that
state law prohibited investment in unauthorized issues and that the
bond's authorization was unconstitutional. Professors Hart and
Wechsler have suggested that the case might support the larger
proposition that
an action arises under federal law, for the purposes of statu-
tory grants of original district court jurisdiction, if in order
for the plaintiff to secure the relief sought he will be obliged
to establish both the correctness and the applicability to his
case of a proposition of federal law-whether that proposition
is independently applicable or becomes so only by reference
from state law.'1 9
In short, if the university can bypass the Skelly Oil test, federal
question jurisdiction for the declaratory judgment action should be
available in the district courts.
b. Administrative Preemption
Discussion of administrative preemption of the controversy re-
quires a preliminary distinction. If a university bargains for specific
actions not required of the contractor by rules and regulations promul-
gated under Executive Order 11246, the university's suit for non-
performance will not raise the question of administrative preemption;
the federal agencies cannot have exclusive jurisdiction over what is
19OSee Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§209(a)(1)-(4), 3 C.F.R. 406 (1970), 42
U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
197 See Cohen, supra note 194, at 910.
198255 U.S. 180 (1921).
199HART & WECHiSLm, .ipra note 172, at 769.
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beyond their command. For example, if the contractor promises
to recruit its labor force from specified minority group referral or-
ganizations, but neither the agency nor the OFCC rules require him
to do so,2"' the university's suit challenging the contractor's perform-
ance would not be dismissed on the ground of administrative pre-
emption, although it might be dismissed for failure to present a federal
question. The problem of administrative preemption arises only when
the contractor's obligations are not viewed as specially "bargained for"
by the university, as when the contract merely contains the language
required by Executive Order 11246. The Tufts contract, and most
contracts heretofore negotiated under the Order, fit into this category.
A strong argument can be made that a university should be denied
the power to enforce the requirements of Executive Order 11246 as
copied into this latter variety of contract. The Order appears to dele-
gate exclusive power over administration and enforcement to the
Government; the administering agencies are given primary responsi-
bility for obtaining compliance with rules propounded by the Secretary
of Labor 201 and are directed to attempt to impose sanctions on the
contractor only after attempting to obtain compliance through "con-
ference, conciliation, mediation, or persuasion." 202 Thus the uni-
versity's attempt to enforce the Order by judicial action might be
considered improper interference with the administrative compliance
scheme. The university's role as grantee of federal funds under the
Order and regulations is at best subsidiary. The regulations plainly
direct the university to "assist the administering agency in the discharge
of the agency's primary responsibility for securing compliance." 208
The vesting of this primary authority for enforcing Executive
Order 11246 in government officials does not, however, entirely fore-
close adjudication of the university's claim, for the proposed litigation
need not necessarily be characterized as an action to enforce the Order.
Rather, the university's complaint could emphasize that the provisions
of the Order were merely incorporated into a private contract. Re-
course to administrative regulations might then be required to interpret
the intention of the parties, but would not necessarily preclude char-
acterization of the action as essentially contractual.
The case law on this issue is sparse. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts accepted Tufts' characterization of such an action as
contractual:
200 E.g., Harvard contract discussed at text accompanying notes 263-74 infra.
201 Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 205, 3 C.F.R. 404-05 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(Supp. V, 1970).2 02 1d. §§205, 209(b), 3 C.F.R. 405, 406 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V,
1970).
203 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(b) (7) (1970) (emphasis added).
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In the instant case the University does not seek to enforce the
terms of the Executive Order but seeks to enforce the pro-
visions of its contract with the defendant. The fact that a
specific provision in the contract is covered by a regulation
of a Federal agency regarding the enforcement of that regu-
lation does not deprive the University of the right to enforce
the contractual obligations. °4
But other courts have denied standing, on grounds of administrative
preemption, to even the actual beneficiaries of the Order, minority
group workers alleging discrimination. In Parkas v. Texas Instru-
ment, Inc.,205 the Fifth Circuit held that a worker's claim of employer
discrimination violating the Executive Order did not state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The court relied heavily on the history
and enforcement of the Order, finding an intent not to allow judicial
actions initiated by private parties, even after a plaintiff had exhausted
all administrative remedies.
The issue of administrative preemption, then, is far from resolved.
Characterization of the litigation as contractual and the resolution of
two parties' obligations under a document they negotiated may pro-
vide a basis for judicial cognizance of the action. But the delegation
of enforcement powers to the administering agency provides a formida-
ble barrier to judicial relief.
c. Primary Jurisdiction
Even if the Order does not preclude university enforcement of
its provisions copied into the construction contract, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction may transfer the initial determination of compli-
ance from the court to the agency. Unlike administrative preemption,
primary jurisdiction does not exclude judicial contemplation of the
action. The doctrine merely requires, whenever a court finds that an
agency has exclusive authority to make certain determinations deemed
relevant to the controversy, that judicial action be held in abeyance
until the agency's determinations are completed.20 6
Professor Jaffe 107 has suggested three reasons for the operation
of the doctrine. Uniformity of decision is of first importance. The
efficient and effective administration of the vast number of contracts
subject to the Executive Order obviously requires uniformity of inter-
pretation. The other two reasons, the necessity of investigation and
204 Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Constr. Co., M-7379 (Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct., Dec. 8, 1970).
-205 375 F2d 629, 632-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) ; see Farmer
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8-10 (3d Cir. 1964) (dictum); cf. Gnotta v.
United States, 415 F2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969).20 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
207L. JAFFE, JuDIciAL CONTROL OF ADmiNISTRATIWE AcTioN 121-34 (1965).
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evaluation of complex and technical materials and the need for the
employment of expertise in the area, are less than compelling in the
case of university-contractor litigation. As argued above,208 judicial
experience with questions of racial discrimination and its remedies
under title VII provides adequate standards for adjudication of con-
tractor compliance without expert analysis of complex data.
Thus a court taking jurisdiction over the university's action might
defer to the Secretary of Labor or the administering agency for a
definition of compliance. Invocation of primary jurisdiction would be
unusual absent an established administrative proceeding for determina-
tion of the issues in the university-contractor situation, but it might be
necessary for the court to ask the agency to make a presentation before
the court.209 In any event, a finding of primary jurisdiction would
undercut the university's purpose for pursuing judicial action-circum-
vention of the slow and inadequate administrative process.
d. Joinder of Parties
(i) Government Agency
A significant argument can be made that the agency granting
money to the university should be joined under rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a party to the university-contractor litiga-
tion. The agency's ability to institute subsequent proceedings might
well make it "so situated that the disposition of the action in [its]
absence may . . . leave [one] of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise incon-
sistent obligations by reason of [its] claimed interest." 210
If the agency is so characterized, rule 19 provides that it will be
joined unless the joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. In the university-contractor litigation jurisdiction
would not be defeated unless the agency refused to join and the court
endeavored to make it a defendant rather than an involuntary plain-
tiff.211  Such judicial characterization of the agency position would
again raise the spectre of sovereign immunity.
212
208 Text accompanying notes 107-30 supra.
209 JAFFE, stepra note 207, at 1038.
210 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2) (ii). State joinder rules may well be less demand-
ing. In the Tufts litigation, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that even assuming that the Secretary of Labor was the enforcing party
as far as Executive Order 11246 was concerned, he was not a necessary party under
state law. The court emphasized that the university was seeking to enforce its
contract rather than the Order, and reasoned that all persons or groups who might
conceivably be affected by the outcome of the contractual litigation did not need to
be made parties to the suit. Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Constr. Co., M-7379
(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Dec. 8, 1970).
2 11 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2) (ii).
2 12 See note 172 supra.
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Characterization of the agency as a defendant appears unlikely,
however, because of the agency's general alignment with the interests
of the university. But even if the agency were so characterized, the
probable consequence would be dismissal of the agency from the action
rather than dismissal of the entire suit for nonjoinder. All four con-
siderations specified by rule 19(b) to be weighed in deciding whether
the entire action should be dismissed support retention of the suit. For
example, judgment rendered in the absence of the agency would
hardly be prejudicial to the parties. The agency's failure to join would
imply lack of interest in the proceedings and could consequently sug-
gest the improbability of subsequent agency action against the con-
tractor. Similarly, given the university's lack of standing in adminis-
trative proceedings and its inability to sue the agency, the university's
situation clearly fits the rule's policy that a plaintiff should not be left
without an adequate remedy because of dismissal for nonjoinder.
Hence, application of the joinder provisions to the agency should
benefit rather than deter the university's proposed litigation. Rule 19
may bring the agency into the litigation, perhaps adding support for
the university's position and providing the means for presentation of
any finding required by primary jurisdiction.
(ii) Unions
Even more persuasively, rule 19 would require joinder of any
union locals involved in preferential hiring hall agreements with the
contractor. Without joinder the court would be unable to reach the
contractor's contractual relationship with the unions, and would be
forced to choose between two courses of action, either of which would
necessitate recourse to the joinder rules. If the court found for the
university but refused to require minority group hiring because un-
willing to interfere with the contractor's union agreements, it would
be withholding complete relief solely because of the absence of the
unions. 2 13  If, on the other hand, the court granted the university's
prayer for specific performance of the contractor's hiring duty as
defined by title VII analogies, it might leave the contractor subject to
inconsistent obligations." 4 Hence, the union locals satisfy the rule 19
standards for persons to be joined if feasible. Joinder of the unions
would be less likely to precipitate dismissal of the action than joinder
of the government agency. The unions' presence would not affect the
court's subject matter jurisdiction and service of process on the locals
should be easily effectuated.
213 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
.
214 See id. 19(a) (2) (ii).
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4. Conclusion
The judicial system fails as a productive source for achieving the
university's aims. Ripeness and sovereign immunity would defeat
jurisdiction in an action against the government agency. Adminis-
trative preemption and the Skelly Oil doctrine might well bar a
suit against the contractor. Moreover, the actions contemplated could
not deal with the university's basic problems. Vindication of the uni-
versity's actions in a suit against the agency would neither appease the
students nor result in the hiring of more minority group workers. A
favorable decision against the contractor probably could not be reached
before the completion of the construction. The litigation would then
at best serve as precedent for subsequent confrontations. In short, if
judicial action were the only available approach, the university's role in
promoting minority group employment in the construction industry
would be insignificant.
IV. THE PRECONTRACTUAL APPROACH
The previous section has demonstrated that the limitations on
administrative and judicial action prevent a university from effectively
promoting minority group employment on its own construction proj-
ects, or in the industry as a whole, if the university is limited to en-
forcing an undefined equal employment opportunity clause in its general
contract. A more promising approach would seem to be the inclusion
of well-defined obligations in the construction contract prior to its
award. Such clauses would represent part of the university's specif-
ically bargained-for consideration rather than the mere incorporation
of the vague, difficult administrative specifications of the Order, and
enforcement of the clauses should clearly be available at least in the
state courts.2 5 To determine what provisions to include in its contract,
the university should examine recent executive promulgations relating
to specific geographical areas. Such rulings provide the most sophis-
ticated administrative analogue to a private precontractual approach.
A. Recent Trends in the Scope of the Contractor's Duty
Under Executive Order 11246
1. The Philadelphia Plan 1'
On June 27, 1969,17 finding especially severe underemployment
215 Text accompanying note 200 supra.
216 2 CCH Em?. PRAc. GUIDE 1 16,175 (June 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as June
27, 1969 Order].
217 A second order was issued on September 23, 1969. 2 CCH Emp. PRAc. Gunks
16,176 (Sept. 23, 1969) [hereinafter cited as September 23, 1969 Order]. The Plan
[Vo1.119:91
MINORITY GROUP EMPLOYMENT
of minority group workers in seven skilled construction trades 218 in
the Philadelphia area,219 the Department of Labor produced the Phila-
delphia Plan to elucidate the "affirmative action" obligation of Execu-
tive Order 11246. The Plan's stated policy was that
In order to promote the full realization of equal employ-
ment opportunity on Federally-assisted projects, it is the
policy of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance that no
contracts or subcontracts shall be awarded for Federal and
Federally-assisted construction in the Philadelphia area on
projects whose cost exceeds $500,000 unless the bidder sub-
mits an acceptable affirmative action program which shall
include specific goals of minority manpower utilization, meet-
ing the standards included in the invitation or other solici-
tation for bids, in trades utilizing [certain] classifications of
employees . .. .22
The Plan is based on a comprehensive study by OFCC, setting specific
quantitative minority manpower goals for each of the specified trades
over a period of four years. The targets range from an average of
four to nine percent minority employment in the first year to nineteen
to twenty-four percent in the fourth year. 1  To be eligible for a
contract, the bidder must set specific goals within this range for
minority manpower utilization in his affirmative action program.' If
the contractor meets the percentage goals according to schedule, he is
presumed to be in compliance with Executive Order 11246.
became effective on September 29, 1969. An earlier plan had been put into effect on
November 30, 1967. June 27, 1969 Order. It required contractors to state numerical
goals in such a way as to serve as part of the basis for determining the lowest
responsible bidder, but it was suspended because of an opinion by the Comptroller
General that it violated the principles of competitive bidding. But see Weiner v.
Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970) ("Cleveland Plan" based on similar principles consti-
tutional and a proper action under title VII). The Comptroller General now opposes
the revised Plan on the ground that it violates title VII. Philadelphia Plat Viewed
as Illegal by Comptroller General, 1 CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 115082 (Aug. 5, 1969);
note 225 infra.
218The trades were subsequently reduced to six: ironworkers, plumbers and pipe-
fitters, steamfitters, sheet metal workers, electrical workers, and elevator construction
workers. September 23, 1969 Order § 2.
219 The Department of Labor is considering the extension of the "Philadelphia
Plan" concept to 18 cities unless they devise their own plans for ending job dis-
crimination in the construction industry. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1970, at 30, col. 5.
Chicago and Pittsburgh were cited as cities which have devised such acceptable "home
town solutions." Text accompanying note 274 infra. Other cities have subsequently
negotiated similar plans. Note 281 infra.
220 June 27, 1969 Order § 3.
221 September 23, 1969 Order § 4.
222 If the contractor agrees to participate in a multi-employer areawide program
approved by OFCC, he is not subject to the minority manpower goals requirement.
June 27, 1969 Order § 5; see note 219 supra.
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The Plan gives content to the rhetoric of OFCC regulations'9 3
by establishing a standard by which compliance can be measured. The
specific standard benefits the enforcement agency by ostensibly ensur-
ing immediate entrance of minority group workers into the construc-
tion industry, and by providing a readily administrable measure of
compliance with the "affirmative action" obligation.' The standard
provides the contractor with a concrete formula for compliance.
Despite these advantages, the Philadelphia Plan raises substantial legal
questions, particularly concerning the legality of its numerical goals, a
point vigorously debated by the Comptroller General 22 and the Attor-
ney General." 6 The Plan raised strong opposition from both the con-
tractors and unions.2 27  The Philadelphia Plan must be thoroughly
examined to judge whether it requires illegal quota hiring before its
principles are proposed for inclusion in a university construction
contract.
2. The Legality of Minority Group Employment Quotas
a. The Impact of Title VII
Although title VII does not wholly preempt executive power to
implement a policy of nondiscriminatory employment,2 it does limit
that power. The Executive may not impose requirements that in
themselves require a contractor to violate the nondiscrimination pro-
visions of the Act.
=For a discussion of those regulations as made applicable to postcontractual
compliance efforts, see text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
224 Labor Dep't Issues Policy Statement Describing Its Role in Civil Disputes
Affecting Construction Industry, 1 CCH Emi. PRAC. GUIDE 118118 (Oct. 9, 1969);
Fletcher, Implications of Philadelphia Plat for Minority Contractors, 1 CCH Em?.
PRAc. GUIDE 118096 (Aug. 25, 1969).
225 The Comptroller General argued that the Plan requires quota hiring, and
subsequently refused to authorize expenditures under it. Philadelphia Plat Viewed
as Illegal by Comptroller General, 1 CCH Eiap. PRAc. GUIDE 5082 (Aug. 5, 1969).
226 The Attorney General argued that the Plan does not require quota hiring.
Attorney General Decides Philadelphia Plan Is Legal, 1 CCH EM?. PRAc. GUIDE
ff 5083 (Sept. 22, 1969). In Congress an amendment was defeated which would have
given the Comptroller General explicit authority to cut off federal funds to those
programs he felt were illegal. The amendment was commonly referred to as the
"Philadelphia Plan rider." 115 CONG. REc. S 17624-35 (daily ed. Dec. 22. 1969).
Although the Senate first passed the amendment, id. S 17131, S 17151, S 17157 (daily
ed. Dec. 18, 1969), the House defeated it, id. H 13983-89 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969),
and the Senate also reversed itself. Id. S 17623-36 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969). Recog-
nizing the apparent congressional desire to implement the Plan, the Comptroller
General has dropped his previously announced plans to refuse to pay contractors
complying with its terms. Comment, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas
on Federal Contracts, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 817, 824 (1970).
227 See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).




Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted
to require any employer, employment agency, labor organiza-
tion, or joint labor-management committee subject to this
subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed by any employer, referred or clas-
sified for employment by any employment agency or labor
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any
labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any ap-
prenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area.=
The proviso raises the issue whether an executive requirement of
"preferential treatment" or quota hiring of minority group workers
would itself violate title VII. On its face the section does not apply
to substantive obligations outside title VII's legislative scheme. Rather,
the proviso simply states that "[n] othing contained in this subchapter
shall be interpreted to require . . .preferential treatment." Arguably,
therefore, the Executive may, consistent with title VII, establish higher
substantive standards for achieving equal employment opportunity.
230
The legislative history clarifies the limited purpose of the proviso.
Southern Senators argued that the proposed bill would require prefer-
ential treatment of minority group workers, quota hiring, and racial
balancing. 3 ' The Department of Justice"3 2 and Senators Clark and
Case, bipartisan captains of the bill,2 33 answered these objections in
separate interpretative memoranda, arguing that the Act did not require
such practices. 3 4 The proviso was then inserted to prevent an inter-
229 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
2 3o See Note, supra note 1, at 599-600.
231 See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 BROOKLYiN L. Rnv. 62, 76 (1964) ("Perhaps no charge was made more
frequently by the opponents of Title VII, both in and out of Congress, than that the
title would require or authorize the imposition of racial quotas upon employers and
labor organizations.") ; Cooper & Sobol, supra note 109, at 1613.
232 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
233 Id. 7217.
234 There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial
balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to main-
tain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve a
violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would require the
employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of -race. It must be empha-
sized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual. While the pres-
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pretation making maintenance of a racially imbalanced work force
illegal per se.235  Section 703 (j), therefore, only establishes that quota
hiring is not required by title VII. It does not determine whether
quota hiring is actually illegal. 36
(ii) The General Nondiscrimination Provisions
Affirming the purpose of the Act, both legislative history and
judicial dicta have deemed quota hiring invalid under title VII.23'
For example, on the date the Act was signed, Senator Humphrey issued
"A Concise Explanation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964":
The title does not provide that any preferential treatment
in employment shall be given to Negroes or to any other
persons or groups. It does not provide that any quota
systems may be established to maintain racial balance in
employment. In fact, the title prohibits preferential treatment
for any particular group. 3'
Similarly, in Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 9 al-
though upholding one aspect of a plan similar to the Philadelphia Plan,
the Ohio Supreme Court stated: "The establishment of a quota of
ence or absence of other members of the same minority group in the work
force may be a relevant factor in determining whether in a given case a
decision to hire or to refuse to hire was based on race, color, etc., it is only
one factor, and the question in each case would be whether that individual
was discriminated against.
Id. 7213.
235 Cooper & Sobol, sutpra note 109, at 1613-14.
236 See generally note 249 infra.
237The imposition of racial employment quotas either by the government or
private parties arguably would violate the equal protection clause. Cf. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),; Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and
"the Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963) ; Shubert, State Action
and the Private University, 24 RUTGERs L. REv. 323 (1970). Although the consti-
tutionality of preferential treatment in general is unsettled, it has been argued that
the courts should apply a permissive standard of review. See generally Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 F-ARV. L. REV. 1065, 1104-20 (1969). One com-
mentator has argued that governmental imposition of racial quotas is not only con-
stitutionally permissible but constitutionally required. Comment, supra note 226, at
829-35; cf. Comment, The Constitutionality of "Affirmative Action" to Integrate the
Construction Trades: The Philadelphia Plat, 43 TEmPLE L.Q. 329 (1970).
238 110 CONG. REc. 15,866 (1964). Other portions of the legislative history
support his statement. Senator Clark, the floor manager for the majority, stated:
There is no provision . . . that requires or authorizes any Federal agency
or Federal court to require preferential treatment for any . . . group for
the purpose of achieving racial balance. . . . The same is true of labor
organizations. . . . [A]ny deliberate attempt to maintain a given balance
would almost certainly run afoul of title VII .... What title VII seeks to
accomplish . . . is equal treatment for all.
Id. 7207; see id. 7217 (Clark-Case interpretative memorandum).
239 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
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employment of any particular minority would . . . be discriminatory
in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 240
Even though title VII has been interpreted to forbid all quotas,
a further question is whether title VII requires "colorblind" employ-
ment practices, as the Comptroller General argued in his broadside
attack upon the Philadelphia Plan.24 The language of section 703 (a)
seems to lead reasonably to such a conclusion, for it provides that an
employer may not "fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual, or other-
wise . . . discriminate against any individual with respect to . . .
terms . . . of employment, because of such individual's race .
But if title VII were so interpreted, the Philadelphia Plan could not
stand despite its safeguards because it makes race a factor in hiring
practices and procedures.2 43 To interpret title VII to require com-
pletely colorblind hiring practices, however, would not only make the
title internally inconsistent but might also render it unconstitutional.
Title VII prohibits not only overt racial discrimination but also
practices which, although neutral on their face, adversely affect minor-
ity group workers without the justification of business necessity.2'
An employer must consequently be "racially conscious" in order to
comply with the statute.2" It would be anomalous to require eradica-
tion of discriminatory employment practices in one sentence and deny
effective implementation of this obligation in the next. Moreover,
because of the federal government's involvement in federal and federally
2 4 0 Id. at 39, 249 N.E2d at 910. Those courts which have directly considered
racial quotas in other areas have found them unlawful. See Hughes v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P2d 885, aff'd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (injunction issued to
restrain picketers from attempting to induce store owners to employ workers in
proportion to racial origins of customers upheld because quotas violated state policy);
Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, supra note 237, at 1118.
241
Whether the provisions of the Plan requiring a bidder to commit himself
to hire-or make every good faith effort to hire-at least the minimum num-
ber of minority group employees specified in the ranges established for the
designated trades is, in fact, a "Quota" System (and therefore admittedly
contrary to the Civil Rights Act) or is a "Goal" System, is in our view
largely a matter of semantics, and tends to divert attention from the end
result of the Plan-that contractors commit themselves to making race or
national origin a factor for consideration in obtaining their employees.
We view the imposition of such a requirement on employers engaged in
federal or federally assisted construction to be in conflict with the intent as
well as the letter of the above provisions of the Act which make it an
unlawful employment practice to use race or national origin as a basis for
employment.
Philadelphia Plan Viewed as Illegal by Comptroller General, 1 CCH EMP. PRAc.
GUIDE f1 5082, at 3787 (Aug. 5, 1969).
24242 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1964).
243 See Comment, The Constitutionality of "Affirmative Action," supra note 237,
at 333.
244 Text accompanying notes 108-22 supra.
2 4 5 Text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
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assisted construction, 240 acquiescence in the perpetuation of discrim-
ination through "neutral" employment practices by pursuing a color-
blind policy would be unconstitutional.247  The sounder interpretation,
more consonant with title VII's broad purpose to end employment dis-
crimination,248 is that although an employer may perhaps not hire for
the sake of a quota solely on the basis of race without regard to indi-
vidual qualifications, he often must take the racial consequences of his
employment practices into account.
2 49
b. Implications of Title VII for the Philadelphia Plan
In the Philadelphia Plan 25 0 the Government devised two safe-
guards against quota hiring. First, it commissioned a detailed study of
the Philadelphia area to fix ranges of minority employment which a
nondiscriminatory affirmative action program would produce. Second,
the obligation to meet the Plan's goals is not absolute: "In the event
of failure to meet the goals, the contractor shall be given an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that he made every good faith effort to meet
his commitment." 251 And, in "any proceeding in which such good
246 Comment, The Constitutionality of "Affirmative Action," supra note 237, at
333-35; Comment, supra note 226, at 832-35.
247 Sources cited note 246 supra. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency,
395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968) (footnotes omitted), the court stated:
What we have said may require classification by race. That is some-
thing which the Constitution usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an
impermissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our
national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial in-
equality. Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be
allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race,
it will be required.
248 See Note, supra note 55, at 33.
249 Phrasing the issue in terms of preferential treatment makes this distinction
more difficult to articulate. Suppose a contractor has a hiring hall arrangement with
a union discriminating against minority group workers in referrals. If the contractor
does not broaden his recruitment base to include referrals from the minority com-
munity, he may have violated both title VII and the Executive Order. See text
accompanying notes 107-30 supra. But if he hires a minority group worker when
an equally or more qualified white is available in the hall, he may be subject to a
charge of preferential treatment. The issue may be semantically unresolvable, but
because white workers as a group are not entitled to continued preference in hiring,
their employment opportunities as a group must arguably be curtailed to eradicate
discrimination against minority group workers. Cf. Blumrosen, supra note 109, at
490. Section 703(j) itself recognizes this point by seemingly not applying where
the contractor is under an obligation to eradicate the effects of prior discrimination.
Section 703(j) merely states that the Act is not to require preferential treatment"on account of" racial imbalance. See Berg, supra note 231, at 76-78; Blumrosen,
supra note 109, at 492-94; Gould, Black Power in the Unions, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 81
n.155 (1969).
Of course, all attempts at distinction may be fruitless and quota hiring may not
only be valid under title VII but also constitutionally required to eradicate discrimi-
nation. See note 237 supra. The discussion in the text assumes the invalidity of
quotas because of the obvious risks a university would encounter if it challenged
the existing judicial and legislative precedents by including quotas in its contract.
250 June 27, 1969 Order.
251 Id. § 8a.
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faith performance is in issue, the contractor's entire compliance posture
shall be reviewed and evaluated in the process of considering the
imposition of sanctions." 252 To obviate any charge that good faith
requires reverse discrimination, the Plan explicitly states that the
contractor's obligations are "not intended and shall not be used to dis-
criminate against any qualified applicant or employee." 253
Yet the Philadelphia Plan might still be invalid if it results in
de facto quotas. Contractors may find it difficult to produce evidence
of "good faith" compliance efforts without using a quota system to
avoid the presumption of noncompliance. 4  But accurate goals and a
specific definition of "good faith" can reduce the danger of a contractor's
reliance upon a de facto quota.
(i) The Calculation of Goals
To avoid the difficulty of fixing percentages that would require
quotas or else be meaningless, the percentages should be calculated to
reflect the availability of minority group manpower in the existing
labor pool. The Philadelphia Plan listed several factors in the cal-
culation.25 First, an accurate analysis must at least take into account
three categories of minority group workers to be drawn into the labor
pool: journeymen skilled in a trade, partially trained workers willing
and able to move into the construction crafts with a modicum of up-
grading, and untrained workers willing to be trained in a construction
trade.2 56 Second, the analysis must take into account the location of
projected construction in relation to housing patterns and available
transportation. 7  Third, the analysis must consider the extent of
past and present discrimination in apprenticeship programs and union
locals, and at construction sites. Minority group members may be
252 Id.
25Id. § 6b (2).
24See Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws
Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 817, 834-
35 (1967). Interestingly, Professor Winter's argument was primarily directed toward
title VII. Cf. Berg, stpra note 231, at 76-78.
255 June 27, 1969 Order § 6c, listed four critical factors:
(1) The current extent of minority group participation in the trade.
(2) The availability of minority group persons for employment in such trade.
(3) The need for training programs in the area and/or the need to assure
demand for those in or from existing training programs.
(4) The impact of the program upon the existing labor force.
256AIthough determining the number of fully qualified journeymen in minority
groups may involve a simple head count, the determination of prospective craftsmen
entails subtle calculations. Cf. M. Zymelman, Criteria for Targets for Job Creation
and Job Upgrading for the Nonwhite Urban Ghetto Labor Force: An Analysis and
Projection of Metropolitan Area Manpower Demand and Supply, Nov. 1968 (unpub-
lished paper prepared for "The Urban Ghetto Study Program" of The Laboratory for
Environmental Studies, MIT).
257 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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reluctant to enter the skilled trades because of past discrimination; 25
but intensive recruitment efforts can make them part of the available
labor pool. Finally, the analysis must take into account existing
training programs. The means for preparing untrained minority
group workers for entry into the trades are essential. These calcula-
tions are difficult but available statistical techniques can provide
reasonably accurate standards for dealing with employment problems
in a particular area.
(ii) Standards of Good Faith
Standards of good faith should be objective, reasonable, and as
specific as possible to obviate employer recourse to the concrete goals
of quota hiring. Under the Philadelphia Plan good faith is determined
by the contractor's efforts to "broaden his recruitment base" through
the following activities:
(a) The OFCC Area Coordinator will maintain a list of
community organizations which have agreed to assist any
contractor in achieving his goal of minority manpower utili-
zation by referring minority workers for employment in the
specified trades. A contractor who has not met his goals
may exhibit evidence that he has notified such community
organizations of opportunities for employment with him on
the project for which he submitted such goals as well as
evidence of their response.
(b) Any contractor who has not met his goal may show that
he has maintained a file in which he has recorded the name
and address of each minority worker referred to him and
specifically what action was taken with respect to each such
referred worker. If such worker was not sent to the union
hiring hall for referral or if such worker was not employed
by the contractor, the contractor's file should document this
and the reasons therefor.
(c) A contractor should promptly notify the OFCC Area
Coordinator in order for him to take appropriate action
whenever the union with whom the contractor has a collective
bargaining agreement has not referred to the contractor a
minority worker sent by the contractor or the contractor has
other information that the union referral process has impeded
him in his efforts to meet his goal.
(d) The contractor should be able to demonstrate that he
has participated in and availed himself of training programs
in the area, especially those funded by this Department re-
ferred to in Section 3(c) of this Order [Manpower Ad-
258 See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
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ministration], designed to provide trained craftsmen in the
specified trades."0
Aimed at recruitment and training, the primary means of increas-
ing minority group employment in the construction trades, these
standards are sufficiently specific to diminish most of the danger of
quota hiring. Yet these standards reintroduce, albeit in a more sophis-
ticated version, the procedures for compliance deemed inadequate under
HUD guidelines. 6 ' Quantitative goals, however, inform the con-
tractor what intensive efforts he must make through the good faith
procedures to attain the specified range of minority group employment.
c. Conclusion
There has been little experience under the Philadelphia Plan, but
assuming the criteria enumerated above are retained, the Plan should
be held consistent with title VII. Both the Attorney General and a
court that has directly considered the Plan26 have found it valid
despite disagreement by the Comptroller General.2' A university at
the precontractual stage might desire to adopt its provisions. Private
incorporation of the substance of a Philadelphia Plan, however, may
result in illegality. The inherent safeguards in the administrative
scheme, such as procedural due process in judging good faith and
expertise in formulating goals, are absent in the case of private incor-
poration. These problems require further careful analysis.
B. The Harvard Contract
The factual background of the Harvard contract has been dis-
cussed 3  This section examines the significant provisions of its final
contract.
1. The Manning Tables and the Good Faith Standard
The Harvard contract provided for nineteen to twenty-three per-
cent minority group employment in specified crafts. These goals were
stated in a series of manning tables, and the contract provided that:
The Contractor assumes the affirmative duty, pursuant to
Executive Order 11246, of achieving the range of minority
259 Ranges for Implementation of Philadelphia Plan, 2 CCH EMa,. PRAc. GUIDE
f[ 16,176 (Sept. 23, 1969).
2 60 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
261 Contractors Ass'n v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ; cf. Weiner
v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
262 1 CCH Ermp. PRAc. GuIDE 1 5082 (Aug. 5, 1969).
2G3 Text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
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employment set forth in the attached manning table for the
entire project.
A good faith standard for judging compliance followed, designed to
eliminate unwarranted contractor liability and illegal quota hiring: 264
The Contractor's effort and the results of his program shall
be reviewed by the Contractor's E.E.O. [Equal Employment
Opportunity] officer, Harvard's E.E.O. Officer and repre-
sentatives of the Buildings and Grounds Department in order
to determine if the Contractor has acted in good faith in the
discharge of his responsibilities towards his stated policy.
[Emphasis added.]
Harvard's problem was the absence of a factual basis for the
goals it established. The nineteen to twenty-three percent targets 265
for minority group employment in the manning tables are quite high,
given the relatively low numbers of blacks and Puerto Ricans in
Harvard's vicinity.2 66 They are, in fact, the same high goals the
university rejected in earlier negotiations with black students as un-
reasonable and discriminatory.2 67 Harvard had no thorough demo-
graphic study upon which to base its percentages. Rather, Harvard
accepted, with some enlargement, the figures suggested by the con-
tractor. The university assumed that the contractor's intensive efforts
would uncover sufficient minority group workers to fulfill the con-
tractual goals, without raiding other construction projects.
The problem of setting speculative goals enters wherever there is
no independently made labor study of the area, and most universities
must necessarily negotiate their contracts on a subjective view of the
available labor pool of minority group workers. This is unsatisfactory
when contrasted with the study behind the Philadelphia Plan, for,
although it may involve some speculation, the Philadelphia Plan study
is supported by all the resources, experience, and expertise of the
Labor Department's Division of Manpower Administration. No uni-
versity or group of universities is likely to conduct as comprehensive
a study; nor would their study be as acceptable to the parties.
The lack of a factual basis for the Harvard percentages again
raises the question of quota hiring. And even if the contractor does
not hire on the basis of quotas, he may be forced to juggle his work
force on other projects, moving his minority group workers to the
264 See text accompanying notes 250-60 supra.
265 The target set for minority employment in the Public Health-Education
Facilities Building was 16%. This lower figure reflects the more highly technical
nature of the construction.
2 6 6 See note 85 Yupra.
267 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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university construction and putting white journeymen in their former
jobs-all resulting in no net gain of minority group workers in the
construction industry.
The increased possibility of quota hiring emphasizes the impor-
tance of a good faith standard of compliance in the Harvard contract
situation. The Harvard good faith standard is more lenient than
that found in the Philadelphia Plan. Under the Philadelphia Plan
failure to meet percentage goals raises a presumption of noncompliance
which the contractor must rebut by evidence of his good faith, but
under the Harvard contract the university has the normal burden of
proving the contractor's lack of good faith.
Either extreme in setting the percentage goals may produce un-
desirable results. The parties may be subject to the criticism that the
contractual goals were actually negotiated high for publicity purposes
rather than as real standards of compliance. If the university chooses
relatively conservative, self-regulating goals, students may chastise it
for adopting half-measures.
2. Subcontracts
The Contractor shall require, by use of contract clauses, that
each subcontractor shall agree to the Contractor's equal em-
ployment opportunity policy.
The Contractor shall require each proposed subcontractor to
submit a written affirmative action program prior to the
award of the subcontract unless the requirement is waived
by the Owner on subcontracts that are less than $50,000 in
value.
The Owner shall review and approve all programs and man-
power tables submitted by the subcontractors.
The Harvard contract grants Harvard the right to review the
manning tables and general affirmative action programs of all sub-
contractors. This right ensures maintenance of the general standards
of the university-contractor agreement in all subsidiary agreements.
Enforcing these standards is difficult, however, because the university
has no direct legal relationship with the subcontractors, and thus no
direct sanctions to invoke against them for noncompliance. Rather,
the university would have to justify any attempt to enforce the sub-
contractor's promises on third party beneficiary principles.
The university could have expressly reserved the right to bring
indirect pressure against the subcontractor by obligating the contractor
to institute enforcement proceedings upon the university's request. Ex-
ecutive Order 11246 itself provides precedent for such an approach:
1970]
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a government contractor is required to "take such action with respect
to any subcontract or purchase order as the contracting agency may
direct as a means of enforcing such provisions including sanctions for
noncompliance." 26  A provision for indemnification by the university
of any damages suffered could protect the contractor in prosecuting
an action on the university's behalf.
3. Hiring
Referral Notices
The Contractor shall direct special effort toward the recruit-
ment of minority workers through referral agencies repre-
senting the minority community, such as the Workers De-
fense League, the Urban League, and the United Community
Construction Workers.
Job Applicants
The Contractor shall maintain records of all minority workers
who apply for work directly at the job site. If the person is
not hired, the reason shall be stated on the application ...
Whenever possible these applications shall be reviewed and
those persons contacted to fill job openings.
Owner Referral
The Contractor shall notify the Owner if he is unable to main-
tain the indicated level of minority workers on the project.
The Owner may then refer qualified minority workers to the
project for employment and the contractor shall so employ
this person or persons.
The contractor's promises to utilize specified minority recruitment
organizations, to accept qualified minority group workers applying for
work directly at the job site, and, if unable to maintain the level of
minority group employment specified in the manning tables, to accept
qualified minority group workers referred by the university, assure
Harvard that the contractor will retain a receptive attitude towards
minority group hiring. The contract fails, however, to relate the
specified hiring practices to the contractor's arrangements with union
local hiring halls. Read literally, the contractual language might force
the contractor to choose between breaking either his contract with the
university or a preferential hiring hall agreement.
2 69
Several other problems also remain unresolved. First, intransigent
union locals could undercut the entire manning tables program. Sec-
ond, even if the union locals allowed the contractor to bypass the hiring
26SExec. Order No. 11,246 §202(7), 3 C.F.R. 403 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §2000e
(Supp. V, 1970).




hall to recruit minority group workers, the likely achievement of only
temporary work permit status by those workers significantly lessens the
long-range benefits of the program. Unless minority workers become
union members, they remain dependent on subsequent university
construction projects or on a continued union policy of granting them
temporary work permits."
The Harvard contract thus leaves significant gaps respecting
minority group hiring which Harvard cannot remedy by merely alter-
ing the contractual language. The contractor's arrangement with the
union local hiring halls is solidified before the university negotiates the
construction contract. And because the construction industry does not
require the unions to bargain with the builder, the university does not
deal directly with the unions, and thus cannot reach the institutions




The Contractor and his subcontractors shall actively seek to
initiate and shall participate in industry training programs
for minority workers.
Should an industry-wide training program be instituted
which, in the judgment of the Owner and the Contractor,
meets the terms and conditions of [the equal employment
opportunity provisions], the provisions of such program shall
be the basis for evaluating compliance ....
The Contractor and his subcontractors shall support the ap-
prenticeship programs and shall actively seek out and sponsor
minority applicants for admission to such programs. The
Owner may refer such persons to the Contractor. 272
The training program provisions are of necessity vague. Their
primary purpose is to assure the university of contractor support for
any industrywide training program established in the area after the
conclusion of the contract.
The contractor's participation in an acceptable industrywide train-
ing program provides a basis for evaluating compliance with his entire
obligation under the equal employment opportunity clause. Similar
provisions are found in the Philadelphia Plan,278 and the Department
270 Of course, unions cannot legally deny membership on the grounds of race.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 §703(c), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(c) (1964). As discussed
above, union membership has become essential to steady employment in the building
trades. Text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.271 See text accompanying notes 15-70 supra.
272 The provisions discussed are those negotiated in the second Harvard contract-
for the construction of public health facilities. The purpose of the primarily linguistic
changes in the original language was to dispel any suggestion that the contractor
was unilaterally obligated to initiate a training program on the construction site.
273 Note 222 supra.
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of Labor has exempted participants in such programs in Chicago and
Pittsburgh from any other duty of affirmative action.Y74
These provisions in the Harvard contract and the OFCC rulings
put the whole "minority employment target" approach in different
perspective. Manning tables were adopted to prevent discrimination
against qualified minority group workers by providing specific stand-
ards for contractor compliance. The willingness of both the Govern-
ment and Harvard to forego the target approach if the contractor
participates in a suitable training program shows that, in their opinion,
the main problem in the construction industry is not overt discrimina-
tion against qualified minority group workers but the absence of such
workers. And even though the Government and the university might
prefer to have both manning tables and a training program, their
bargaining priorities are clear.
V. CONCLUSION
The university attempting to promote minority group employ-
ment in the construction industry has a number of alternative courses
of action open, but each of them raises serious difficulties.
A. A University Acting Alone
1. Postcontract Stage
Once the contract is operative and the contractor's affirmative
action plan has been approved by the administering agency, the uni-
versity is unlikely to be able to secure a significant increase in the
number of minority group workers on the job merely by trying to
enforce the contract.
Because the grantee of federal funds cannot bring an adminis-
trative complaint through the formal procedures established by the
Executive Order,2 71 it must rely on informal means to activate the
administrative process. The Tufts experience amply demonstrates that
administrative action is unlikely to proceed very rapidly, and will
ordinarily involve only investigation and conciliation. Meanwhile the
construction may be completed, mooting the central issue. Federal
compliance standards are so vague that the university may not be able
to risk the liability for damages to the contractor for unilaterally
suspending the contract in the hope that the administering agency will
take action. The judicial system hardly offers better prospects for
relief.2 7 6 Possibly, the agencies or courts will give more meaning to
2 74 See 1 CCH Emp. PRAc. GUIDE 1111 5013-15; note 219 supra.
275 See text accompanying notes 133-52 supra.
276See text accompanying notes 165-214 .ipra.
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the concept of affirmative action, whether on a case-by-case basis, or
by broad regulation. The Allen-Bradley case 277 shows an administra-
tive willingness to look behind a paper program to the actual effects
of employer practices on the minority groups; that case, moreover,
parallels judicial treatment of employment practices under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 Nevertheless, administrative pre-
emption may prevent, and primary jurisdiction may delay too long,
effective judicial relief.
2. Precontract Stage
The university can more effectively ensure compliance with a
program of equal employment opportunity by inserting concrete
standards for affirmative action in its contract. The Harvard contract
shows, for example, that a university can incorporate targets for
minority employment into the construction contract to judge the effec-
tiveness of the contractor's affirmative action. The Harvard model
can be improved, however, by the articulation of more specific criteria
for measuring the contractor's good faith if the targets are not met.
A major problem with the target approach is the absence of reliable
statistics for evaluating the reasonableness of the targets. The uni-
versity, moreover, cannot reach the contractor's preexisting hiring
agreements and collective bargaining arrangements with the unions.
The contractor may be unable to carry out fully the hiring provisions
of the contract, and the minority group workers he hires may be unable
to secure further employment after the job is completed.
The establishment of numerical targets is an effective means for
solving only the problem of discrimination against qualified minority
group workers. The pool of skilled minority workers in the labor
force is disproportionately small. The pool has been kept small by
longstanding patterns of discrimination in training and entry into the
construction trades. On-the-job training programs designed to alter
those patterns of discrimination and elimination of unnecessarily
onerous union membership requirements would be attractive elements
for inclusion in the university's contract. Training programs require
continuous employment over a long period to be successful, and a
single university, except the rare one creating an entire new campus,
is unlikely to be able to provide that employment. Even then, rela-
tively few workers could be trained to full journeyman status through
a single private training program. The absence of a direct bargaining
277 [Aug. 1968-April 1969 Transfer Binder] CCH LAB. L. REP. 8065 (OFC
Dec. 17, 1968), affd, lAug. 1968-April 1969 Transfer Binder] CCH LAB. L. REP.
18070 (See'y of Labor Jan. 16, 1969).278 Text accompanying notes 107-30 supra.
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relationship with the unions and the lack of significant leverage, more-
over, makes university alteration of membership requirements quixotic.
B. Concerted University Action
1. Postcontract Stage
Concerted action can add only the increased political and moral
pressure that comes from additional numbers to the efforts of the
individual university. The universities could make common cause
with other recipients of federal construction grants, such as hospitals,
Model Cities programs, and other institutions under public pressure
to promote nondiscriminatory employment. But the risk of disparate
interests increases with the variety of the institutions and their objec-
tives.
2. Precontract Stage
In the precontract stage, the development of a standard compliance
clause by a consortium of grantees could strengthen the bargaining
position of each of the members. Agreement on a well-considered set
of contract terms would provide insulation from pressures of both
students and contractors. The group of six universities collaborating
after the Tufts crisis found it difficult, however, to reach an agreement
on a compliance clause. Those schools not experiencing severe student
disruptions were unwilling to agree to provisions that would substan-
tially increase their building costs." 9
Similarly, a consortium of universities might be able to pool their
resources to produce an adequate labor market study, but government-
financed studies still seem preferable because of their official character.
Concerted university action is potentially most effective in the
area of training.2 0 First, concerted action might persuade the unions
to become involved in such a program. Union participation is essential
to a training program to ensure the trained minority worker employ-
ment security through union membership. Second, concerted action
279 Students were well aware of this response, and their strategy was to put
pressure on one university after another. Unions and contractors also tried to isolate
the universities and fragment joint efforts. In March 1970, in a union-contractor
effort to draft a regional training program for Boston, a clause was included to bar
any contractor from participating in the program who had signed a contract involving
numerical goals or manning tables. Telephone interview with Paul Parks, Boston
Model Cities Administrator, Mar. 27, 1970.
280 Apart from increasing minority group representation in the labor force, uni-
versities might also aid black contractors. Presently few black contractors are
working on large-scale construction projects because of inexperience and inability
to secure bonding required by federal bidding regulations. Universities acting to-




distinctly enhances the prospects for the continuity of training neces-
sary for a viable program, especially if various other institutions can
be induced to participate.
Some models are already available for such a program. Recently,
contractor, union, and minority group representatives executed a
"Boston Area Construction Industry Equal Employment Opportunity
Agreement" providing for recruitment, training, and employment of
minority group workers on construction projects in the Boston metro-
politan area. The agreement contemplates the recruitment of trained
journeymen workers from the Boston area and the attainment of
union membership status. In addition, the agreement provides for
recruitment and on-the-job training for untrained and partially trained
workers. Those minority group members seeking to enter regular
apprenticeship programs are classified as preapprentices and accorded
supplementary training. Assignment and experience evaluation of
other minority group workers is made by operations committees for
each trade composed of representatives of each of the signatory or-
ganizations. Partially trained workers, designated advanced trainees,
are accorded job preference and paid at an apprenticeship wage com-
mensurate with their performance. Untrained workers, designated
trainees, are paid starting apprenticeship wages.
2s1
Nevertheless, university action in the training area remains specu-
lative. Lacking a direct legal relationship to the unions, even a con-
sortium of universities may not have sufficient leverage within the
total construction taking place in the area to accomplish its objective
of establishing a training program. Certainly the universities would
be unable to mitigate overly restrictive union membership require-
ments so that minority group members successfully completing the
training program would be automatically admitted to the union. Even
the Boston Plan fails to curtail effectively union control over its
membership policies-the agreement simply calls for vigorous efforts
to secure union status for minority group workers.
C. Government Action
Executive Order 11246 imposes an obligation on the grantee of
federal construction funds "to assist and cooperate actively" with
281 In recent months, similar plans have either been executed or negotiated in
several major cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago, St. Louis, New York, and
Pittsburgh. The Department of Labor, which has been responsible for a great deal
of this private activity because of its threat of a government-imposed Philadelphia
Plan, has issued a "Model Area Wide Multi-Employer" agreement with many of the
same provisions found in the Boston Plan. Program to Achieve Equal Job Oppor-
tunity in Federally-Funded Construction Work in 19 Cities, 1 CCH Emp. PRAc.
GuIDE f 5015 (Feb. 9, 1970). For a pessimistic analysis of results under these plans
in several cities, see TImE, Aug. 17, 1970, at 61.
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federal authorities in implementing the Order's equal employment
opportunity objectives. A realistic appraisal of the limitations on
official enforcement capability shows the necessity for grantee co-
operation. Even with greatly increased manpower and money, the
federal enforcement agencies could not, as a practical matter, provide
the detailed monitoring and continuous pressure at each construction
site necessary to guarantee equal employment opportunity. The im-
position of the duty on the grantee represents a delegation of enforce-
ment responsibility to those in the best position to find out about the
contractor's employment policy. The Order does not, however, fully
mobilize the grantees' potential for enforcement. The Secretary of
Labor and the agencies should take several steps to utilize this
potential fully.
First, the Order should be clarified to ensure grantees access
to judicial and administrative remedies. The regulations should pro-
vide standing for grantee complaints to initiate formal administrative
enforcement procedures. Moreover, the regulations should be re-
drafted to eliminate the possibility of administrative preemption and
thereby enable judicial consideration of grantee complaints. Provision
for notice to the enforcement agencies, if the parties had failed to join
them, would enable the Government to interpose its views on the
merits of the controversy and appropriate relief, minimizing the possi-
bility of conflicts between administrative and judicial dispositions.
Even more significant, the administrative agencies could improve
the contractual bargaining position of the grantees by providing area-
wide percentage targets on the pattern of the Philadelphia Plan that
grantees would be required to incorporate into their contracts. Re-
quired targets would insulate the grantee from contractor pressure and
facilitate self-regulation by the parties, without the necessity of ad-
ministrative or judicial intervention. Such targets are within the
rulemaking authority of the Secretary of Labor under the Order.
At a minimum, the Government should be able to provide reliable
official labor market statistics, on the basis of which universities could
bargain for specific targets in their contracts. Reliable statistics for
the Boston-Cambridge area, for example, would help cure the weak-
nesses of the Harvard contract.
In the end, however, targets may only expose the relatively small
size of the pool of qualified minority group workers. One of the most
important Government objectives therefore should be the creation of
training programs to increase this minority pool. First, the Govern-
ment should continue to help fund apprentice "outreach" programs
designed to seek out minority youth and provide specialized training,
coaching, and orientation for entrance into regular union apprenticeship
[Voi.119:91
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programs.28 2 Second, the Government should encourage the develop-
ment of industrywide training programs designed for minority group
workers unable to utilize regular apprenticeship routes. This en-
couragement can take the form of substantive regulations 2S3 or financial
support 284 or both. Grantees could then tie their contracts to effective
programs which they could not have created on their own.
Finally, the Government should proceed directly against the unions
both under title VII and perhaps by alteration of the Executive Order.
Private efforts to modify restrictive policies have been unsuccessful;
Government action should be increased to eradicate membership stand-
ards which adversely affect minority group workers unnecessarily.
2 82 BoK & DuNiLOP, supra note 9, at 131-32.
2
83 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1970, § 1, at 28, col. 4 (requirement of one trainee
for every four journeymen on New York City-financed construction) ; 1 CCH EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE if 5015 (model areawide training program agreement).
2 84 See Manpower Development & Training Program, 42 U.S.C. §§2571-620
(Supp. V, 1970).
